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Vietnam’s recognition and enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards and preparation for 
EVFTA 
Nguyen Phuong Linh, Dinh Hoang Anh, Chu Thanh Giang 
 
Part 1. Investor-State dispute settlement mechanisms 
 
The history of investor – State dispute settlement can be traced back from 
the development history of the treatment of foreign investors and their property 
under international law. In early history of trade, foreign investors were often 
considered ‘outsiders’ and received less treatment than nationals of the country 
they were making investment in1; however, overtime, due to the increase of 
trade and investment, and under the pressure of international law, the interests 
of foreign investors are more protected. Since the aftermath of the World War II 
period, the network of International Investment Agreements (IIAs) 
supplemented by the general rules of international laws started to replace the 
limited diplomatic protection and provide investors dynamic treaty-based 
standards of investment promotion and protection2. More specifically, a foreign 
investor, in case of a mistreatment from the host State that caused injury to their 
investment, may make a claim directly against the host State pursuant to the 
standards provided by the treaties, and they would be a part of the arbitration 
proceedings, instead of relying on the diplomatic protection as before. This 
investor-state arbitration mechanism, or so called the investor-state dispute 
settlement is included in the large majority of today IIAs which are largely 
conformed by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements 
                                                
1 Andrew Newcombe, Lluis Paradell, 2009, ‘Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of 
Treatment’, Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands Publisher. 
2 Ibid 
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(FTAs) with investment chapters. The ISDS mechanism is also a fundamental 
instrument of States to uphold the compliance of commitments that they have 
made in the IIAs3. 
When we talk about ISDS or international arbitration institutions, some 
fora cannot be neglected. This first part of the paper will look at some 
prominent fora and arbitral rules from which we can see the importance of 
arbitration in modern world trade and investment.  
1. ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes)	
  As a result of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of Other States, the ICSID has been established in 
1965 as an international arbitration institution, serving as a platform for 
international investment dispute resolution. As stated in its mandate, the 
purpose of the ICSID is “to provide facilities for conciliation and arbitration of 
investment disputes between Contracting States and nationals of other 
contracting States”.  
Jurisdiction: The jurisdiction of ICSID is over any “legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment”4. There are two sets of procedural rules that the 
Centre mostly often governs and conduct the arbitration with, which are the 
ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, and the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules. While ICSID Convention is for arbitration proceedings for a legal 
dispute between a party state of the convention and a national of another ICSID 
Contracting State, the Additional Facility serves to support non-party investors 
or hosts. As the nature of arbitration is based on the willingness of both parties 
to resolve conflicts, the given consent from both parties for ICSID jurisdiction 
is critical aspect of arbitrators’ authority to hear the claims5.   
                                                
3 OECD, ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement – Public Consultation: 16 May – 9 July 2012’  
4 Article 25(1) of ICSID Convention 
5 Ibid. 
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Choice of arbitrators: The decision on the appointment of the members 
of the tribunal can be made upon agreement between two parties. Most tribunals 
are composed of three arbitrators. If no agreement can be reached, the Chairman 
of Administrative Council will appoint.6 
Proceedings: 
Figure 1.1 Proceedings of ICSID 
 
Firstly, a submission of Request for Arbitration is needed to initiate the 
ICSID arbitration. The request is submitted to the Secretary – General, attached 
with a description of the facts and legal issues. This stage is to determine 
whether the claim was “manifestly outside the jurisdiction of” the ICSID 
Convention. Otherwise, the proceedings shall begin. 
Afterwards, an arbitral tribunal is constituted to deal with preliminary 
consultations and adversarial proceedings. The adversarial proceedings include 
two phases of a written procedure and oral arguments, as a chance for in- person 
hearings and two parties can present their legal arguments, evidence, response, 
etc. Eventually, the tribunal deliberates and renders its award.  
Applicable law: The choice of law is left to the parties upon their 
agreement. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal shall apply the law 
of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its rules on the conflict 
of laws) and such rules of international law as may be applicable”.7 Thus, it 
would be the combination of international law and host State law and 
international law often prevail.  
                                                
6 Articles 37 and 38 of ICSID Convention 
7 Article 42.1 ICSID Convention 
request for 
arbitration registration tribunal award
challenge 
& 
annulment 
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Awards and enforcement: ICSID Arbitral tribunal decisions are to be 
final and not subject to any appeal. This is different to WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism. If a party disagrees with an ICSID award, they can seek the post-
award remedies from an ad hoc annulment committee. There is a thing should 
be bear in mind is that this stage is not to challenge the award on the basis of its 
enforcement. An award may be annulled only in case of malfunctions of the 
Tribunal; or procedural breach; or failure to state the reason on which the award 
is based8. An award is ‘annulled’ means it is “lifted”, set aside either partly or 
completely and the two parties’ status are recovered like initially.  
Rendered awards shall be recognized as binding and pecuniary 
obligations shall be enforced “as if it were a final judgement of a court in that 
State”.9 However, it is important to know that there is a case for waiver of 
immunity from execution for host state when it comes to national foreign 
sovereign.10  
Overtime, ICSID has proved its leading role as one of the most prevalent 
fora among investors and States. The number of investment cases that 
administered by ICSID and applied ICSID rules is the highest of all, comparing 
to other applicable rules and other institutions (Figure 1.2). According to ICSID 
annual report, the centre administered a record of 247 cases over the course of 
the past fiscal year. In other words, in fiscal year 2016 ICSID administered 
about 43% of its entire caseload, which stands at 570 ICSID cases as of June 30, 
2016 (Figure 1.3). As of June 30 2017, ICSID had registered a total of 619 
ICSID cases11, in which ICSID Convention arbitration covers 555 cases 
(89.7%) and for Additional Facility there are 54 arbitration cases (8.7%). A 
major of cases resolved due to Tribunal awards (64%), the rest are either settled 
or discontinued (36%).  
                                                
8 See Article 52.1 ICSID Convention for grounds for annulment 
9 Article 54.1 ICSID Convention 
10 Article 54.3 and 55 ICSID Convention 
11 ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics, Issue 2017 - 2	
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(Source: UNCTAD database12) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3 ICSID Cases administered by the Secretariat (FY2013-FY2016) 
 
(Source: ICSID 2016 Annual Report) 
 
                                                
12	UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS/  
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2. Other fora and arbitral rules for investor -State arbitration 
The Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) 
Looking at the number of cases by applicable arbitration rules from 
Figure 1.2, we can see that the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) ranks 
the third, showing its importance and popularity for investor-State disputes, just 
after the ICSID and UNCITRAL. In terms of administration of investor-state 
disputes, the SCC only ranks after the ICSID, which makes the SCC as the 
second largest forum in the world. 
Since its first registered investment dispute in 1993, the SCC has played a 
leading role of a forum for ISDS arbitration in at least 120 BITs and in the 
Energy Charter Treaty, out of which 61 agreements stipulate that the SCC 
Arbitration Rules shall be applicable rules to investment disputes arising out of 
the agreements13. The UNCTAD database records that in total the SCC 
administered 41 investment cases and applied their own SCC Arbitration Rules 
on 40 investment cases14. Specifically, there are 9 ISDS cases currently 
pending, and the most recent case administered at SCC is newly this year 2017, 
between Puma Energy company and Benin government. Moreover, the SCC 
administered a case between Trinh Vinh Binh and Vietnam Government in 
2004, which was quite much interested by Vietnamese legal and business 
community. The case was settled pursuant to the UNCITRAL arbitral rules and 
under the Netherlands – Vietnam BIT in 1994. 
The internationality of the SCC is represented in the nationalities of the 
SCC’s composition, the geographic distribution of cases, and also the economic 
sectors involved in the disputes. The composition of the SCC is made up of two 
elements: A Board of directors and a Secretariat.15 The Board, which includes 
various nationalities from China, Egypt, Germany, Russia, Sweden, 
                                                
13 SCC website http://sccinstitute.com/dispute-resolution/investment-disputes/  
14 UNCTAD (n 12) updated in 13th November 2017	
15	Article 1, Appendix I, SCC Arbitration Rules 
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Switzerland, UK and USA, shall make decisions related to the administration of 
disputes such as prima facie jurisdiction, consolidation, arbitrator’s 
appointment, etc.16 The Secretariat consists of three legal divisions which 
support respectively two parties and the tribunals. This organization is 
necessary and properly convenient since the legal division shall acts as a 
communication channel between the parties and the tribunal, providing legal 
counsel, administrative assistance as well as taking decisions on the advance on 
costs17.  
Last year 2016 was regarded as an outstanding year for the SCC with the 
number of 199 cases administered at the SCC, the third highest caseload since 
when it was founded in 1917. Out of this nearly 200 cases, more than half of 
them (52%) were international and the rest (48%) are Swedish18. Specifically, 
the disputing parties come from 44 different countries chose to settle their 
dispute at the SCC, for instance, USA, Germany, Russia, Ukraine, and 
Azerbaijan were the most frequent parties at SCC. The balanced ratio between 
foreign and domestic case settled at SCC shows that the SCC is a preferred 
arbitration institution by both Swedish and international business community. 
Finally, regards to the wide coverage of the SCC, nationalities of 
arbitrators and economic sectors should be mentioned. Arbitrators represented 
in SCC cases came from 29 different nations in total19. The top four nations 
with most frequently appointed arbitrators are Sweden, UK, Germany and USA. 
The disputes settled at SCC arise from various economic sectors, including Oil, 
gas and mining sector (34%); Electricity and power (29%); Services and Trade 
(29%); Construction (4%) and Information and Communication (4%). 
 
                                                
16 Article 6, Appendix I, SCC Arbitration Rules. For further statistics of SCC, see Investor-State 
disputes at the SCC, Celeste E. Salinas Quero, Arbitration Institute of the SCC.  
17 Article 8, Appendix I, SCC Arbitration Rules	
18	SCC website: http://www.sccinstitute.com/statistics/		
19	Celeste E. Salinas Quero, ‘Investor-State disputes at the SCC’, Arbitration Institute of the SCC.  
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International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
International Chamber of Commerce constituted the International Court 
of Arbitration as an arbitration body that aims to handle business conflicts 
among businesses across the world and provide technical assistance for parties 
in need. Despite of being called a court in name, ICA does not give judgments. 
Their goal is to ensure that ICC rules are applied properly to administrate 
arbitral proceedings, helping disputing parties resolve conflicts and finally result 
in a binding award. Since established in 1923, there have been 22,000 disputes 
administered by ICC20 and the institution’s Rules of Arbitration now are 
worldwide used to resolve disputes. In January 2017, ICC has just released a 
report of the growth of ICA in 2016 and preliminary statistics revealed that in 
2016, the Court received 966 new requests for arbitration involving 3,099 
parties from 137 countries21. Among those, there are 4 cases were investment 
disputes22. Up to date, the case between a Turkey construction company and 
Libya government (Ustay Yapi Taahut ve Ticaret AS v. Libya) is the first and 
newest investment dispute filed to ICC in 2017. This is a record year for the 
Court in its 94 years of history. Particularly in South and East Asia, ICA 
continues to expand its foothold in the region at the beginning of 2016 with an 
overall increase of 22% in the number of parties participating, with a record 82 
parties from Korea.  
The court is widely renowned for its flexibility, neutrality and various 
resolution services. ICC set up a dispute board as a permanent panel in order to 
help parties avoid any disagreement arising during the performance of their 
contracts. There are three types of dispute board available for choices: Dispute 
Adjudication Boards whose decisions that must be complied with immediately, 
                                                
20	ICC website: https://iccwbo.org/		
21 Ibid.	
22	UNCTAD (n 12)  
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Dispute Review Boards whose recommendations that are not immediately 
binding and finally, Combined dispute boards whose solution is intermediate 
between the other two. Parties wishing to use the Dispute Board Rules should 
include an appropriate reference in their contract. 
Along with giving administration to arbitration cases, the Court also plays 
an active role in education of dispute settlement. The ICC frequently holds 
different training programs for lawyers, arbitrators and judges in international 
arbitration, most of which are implemented by the ICC Institute of World 
Business Law. This is a body established especially for research and educational 
purposes. The Institute’s training programs involves multiple levels from basic 
introductory courses to more advanced workshops, often with mock 
arbitrations.  
ICC has sufficiently acted as the bridge between various parties - 
individuals, businesses and governments - involved in international arbitration 
and surely their ongoing efforts would make ICC arbitration services more 
accessible in the future.  
 
London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) 
Followed the Paris - based ICC, The London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA) is another world’s leading forum for resolving disputes. The 
London court only refers to its headquarters in London. The major international 
characteristic of the LCIA is projected most clearly through the proportion of 
80% of pending LCIA parties are not of English nationality.23 The wide range 
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) related services are provided by LCIA 
to all contractors without any membership requirements. 
The organizational structure of the LCIA is made up of three major 
elements: The Company, the LCIA Court of Arbitration, and the LCIA 
                                                
23	LCIA	website http://www.lcia.org/LCIA/introduction.aspx		
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Secretariat. The Company’s main role is designating the members of the LCIA 
Arbitration Court. The Court bears no judicial power but the final authority for 
the LCIA rule application. Its main responsibilities are tribunal appointment, 
arbitrator challenge determination and cost control. The upper limit of the 
number of members for the LCIA’s Arbitration Court is 35. The President, up to 
seven Vice-Presidents and the Director General constitute the Arbitration 
Court’s officers. The LCIA Secretariat helps administer all cases that referred to 
the LCIA on daily basis, both cases under its own rules (including arbitration 
and ADR services) and cases under UNCITRAL rules as well. Up-to-now, there 
are 6 investment case administered by the LCIA, in which five investment cases 
was under UNCITRAL Arbitral Rules, and one was under its own LCIA 
Arbitral Rules. 
 
 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 
Along with ICSID, ICC and LCIA, the PCA is among the most 
prominent international dispute settlement institution. The Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) was one of the most concrete achievements from the First 
Hague Peace Conference in 1899. Within the scope of the First Hague, the 
Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes had 26 
signatories, were aimed to develop a platform for international dispute 
resolution. The Convention expressed the favour towards arbitration as it is the 
“most effective, and at the same time the most equitable, means of settling 
disputes which diplomacy has failed to settle”24. 
As a by-product from the 1899 Convention, the PCA was inaugurated:  
[w]ith the object of facilitating an immediate recourse to arbitration for 
international differences which it has not been possible to settle by 
diplomacy, the signatory Powers undertake to organize a Permanent 
                                                
24	Article 16, Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes 1899	
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Court of Arbitration, accessible at all times and operating, unless 
otherwise stipulated by the parties, in accordance with the rules of 
procedure inserted in the present Convention. 
Today the PCA is headquartered at the Peace Palace in The Hague, the 
Netherlands and has become an intergovernmental organization providing a 
wide range of services for dispute settlement, especially the ones related to 
oceans or sea laws, through peaceful means: arbitration services, mediation, 
conciliation, appointing authority and fact-finding commissions. Despite the 
name ‘permanent court’, the PCA is not necessarily a permanent international 
judicial body. It has no sitting judges and the parties themselves select the 
arbitrators under the supervision of the appointing authority (The Secretary-
General). A standing body is the Administrative Council, consisting of 
diplomatic representatives of all member nations and the Foreign Minister of 
the Netherlands as Chairman of the administrative council. The Board is 
responsible for providing general guidelines and supervising the operation of 
the PCA. 
They have greatly satisfied the fast-growing dispute settlement needs on a 
global scale thanks to its nature being perfectly combined of both public and 
private aspect of international law.  All parties whether States, States entities or 
private corporations and arbitrators seeking to conduct arbitral proceedings 
under the PCA’s auspices are provided access to its administrative services. 
According to the PCA Annual Report, during the year 2016, the PCA has 
administered 148 cases in total, in which 86 cases are ISDS arbitration arising 
under BIT/multilateral investment treaties or national investment laws25. The 
institution has not released its annual report for 2017, but up to the moment, the 
UNCTAD database records that the PCA has administered 110 investment 
                                                
25 PCA Annual Report 2016 
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case26. The number of administered cases at PCA is continuously increasing, 
especially with 4 cases just within this year 2017.  
 In terms of the procedure for resolving disputes, the PCA does not have 
specific procedural rules applied for all cases, they offer four sets of procedural 
rules that different types of party may use for arbitration, such as: 
- the Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two States 
(1992) 
- the Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of 
which Only One is a State (1993)  
- the Optional Rules for Arbitration between International 
Organizations and States (1996) and 
- the Optional Rules for Arbitration between International 
Organizations and Private Parties (1996) 
However, due to the records of the UNCTAD database, there has been no case 
under PCA arbitral rules; all of the 110 investment cases have been proceeding 
under UNCITRAL rules. 
 
 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules  
Besides having their own arbitration rules, all institutions that introduced 
above do conduct arbitral proceedings under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules if it 
is upon agreement of parties. In other words, unlike with ICSID, there is no 
dedicated institution associated with the administration of arbitrations pursuant 
to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Instead, the organizational work for the 
ad hoc arbitration must be undertaken by the tribunal and the parties.  However, 
the parties may employ the services of administration from institutions such as 
ICSID, PCA, etc.  
                                                
26 UNCTAD (n 12) 	
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Moreover, due to nature, there are certain differences between these two 
most prominent arbitral rules, especially about the challenge, and the 
enforcement of the awards. Regards to ICSID arbitration, the investment dispute 
is placed under the framework of an international treaty – ICSID Convention. 
All signatories to the dispute is bound to respect the obligations under the 
ICSID Convention. Thus, under the convention, foreign investors can have 
access to an international remedy, and national courts in party states of the 
Convention is bound to recognize ICSID arbitration award as if it were a final 
judgment of a court; unless the award falls within one of the grounds for 
annulment provided by the ICSID Arbitration Rules. Therefore, the 
enforcement of final ICSID awards will be solid and highly probable, due to the 
binding institutional regime27. For the UNCITRAL Arbitration (as non-ICSID 
Arbitration), the recognition and enforcement of final arbitral awards is most 
likely governed by the New York Convention 1958. So far, the Convention has 
a very wide scope of signatories – up to 157. Basically, the grounds for a 
national court to annul an arbitral award in the NYC are covered similarly as in 
the ICSID annulment grounds listed above; but some notable additional grounds 
under the NYC are: 
- the national law in the court of enforcement does not permit arbitration of 
the subject matter of the dispute; or 
- recognition or enforcement would be otherwise contrary to public policy28 
This comprehensive set of arbitration rules of UNCITRAL which mostly 
provided for in bilateral investment treaties (BITs) covers all aspects of the 
arbitral process providing a model arbitration clause, regulating in terms of 
arbitrator’s appointment and procedural proceedings, as well as enforcement 
and interpretation of the award. In fact, most arbitration rules of institutions are 
commonly based on UNCITRAL’s with a few amendment or supplement. First 
                                                
27 Piero Bernardini, 2009, ‘ICSID versus Non-ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration’. 
28 Article V.2 the New York Convention 1958 
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adopted in 1976, now the latest version of UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules is the 
2013 version which incorporates the “UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency for 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration”. Compared to the previous time of 
revision in 2010, the 2013 revision only add the new Article 1, paragraph 4 
clarifying the application of the Rules on Transparency in arbitration under 
UNCITRAL Rules. This revision shows a consideration of the Commission 
regards of transparency challenge. It is noteworthy that if arbitration agreements 
(including those contained in BITs) were made before the date that the 2010 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules were concluded (August 15th 2010), then the 
arbitration is instead subject to the 1976 version, unless the parties agree 
otherwise.  
As can be seen, the procedural rules of UNCITRAL are widely chosen 
for ISDS especially in ‘ad hoc’ arbitration. Next to a choice of institutional 
arbitration (with the supervision of an arbitral institution), the ad hoc arbitration 
is gaining prevalence as another arbitral option that investors and States can 
choose to settle their disputes with. But due to the nature of happening for 
specific situation, data on ad-hoc arbitration, however, is off the record. 
Moreover, investors would like to ‘rule shopping’ for those arbitral rules which 
provide the highest level of confidentiality. However, this limitation in public 
disclosure raises concerns for public industries – such as environment, health 
and safety, etc. The new rules on transparency hope to tackle this challenge.  
 
3.    The role of ISDS in international investment 
Regard to stakeholders in investment contractual relationship 
Perhaps the ISDS arbitration is mostly favoured by investors, enterprises 
and businessmen because of its business-friendly nature. As long as the 
arbitration is consensual, whether contractual or not, and the agreement is made 
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before or after the arisen dispute, it can still be enforceable.29 We can take the 
words of Lord Hoffman as an explanation for the preference for arbitration in 
business community. Accordingly, ‘rational businessmen’ have reasonable 
expectations that the purpose of arbitration agreement can answer: 
…In approaching the question of construction, it is therefore 
necessary to inquire into the purpose of the arbitration clause. 
As to this, I think there can be no doubt. The parties have 
entered into a relationship, an agreement or what is alleged to 
be an agreement or what appears on its face to be an 
agreement, which may give rise to disputes. They want those 
disputes decided by a tribunal which they have chosen, 
commonly on the grounds of such matters as its neutrality, 
expertise and privacy, the availability of legal services at the 
seat of the arbitration and the unobtrusive efficiency of its 
supervisory law. Particularly in the case of international 
contracts, they want a quick and efficient adjudication and do 
not want to take the risks of delay and, in too many cases, 
partiality, in proceedings before a national jurisdiction30… 
Even though his words were taken in a context of a contractual business 
relationship between two enterprises, but we can see that the arbitration 
agreement in business is very important as it allows parties to resolve their 
disputes that may arise from their business relationship in a peaceful and 
effective manner. Given that nature, an investment treaty between two states 
offer the same purpose of investment protection to investors. By giving consent 
to arbitration clause in an investment treaty, States allow investors to actively 
seek for remedy in case of a dispute arises out of their investment that caused by 
a mistreatment from the States instead of waiting for States’ exercise of 
                                                
29 Section 6 of The Arbitration Act 1996, Model Law 
30 Premium Nafta Products Limited and others Vs. Fili Shipping Company Limited and others, 
Opinions of the Lords of Appeal for Judgement in the cause, Session 2006-07, [2007] UKHL 40	
 17 
diplomatic protection. This means States provide investment protection to 
foreign investors- a welcome mat that reassures foreign investors enjoy fair 
treatment as domestic ones31.  In investment activities – a business relationship 
between investors and the governments, it is unavoidable that expropriation, or 
nationalization, or a political measure undertaken by the government may injury 
economic interests of foreign investors; in that case, arbitration for reparation is 
vital.    
According to PwC and Queen Mary University of London, the 
preferences of corporations for international arbitration to resolve their cross-
border dispute has also increased, from 73% in 2006 to 90% in 2015.32 
Accordingly, the top valuable characteristics of ISDS to investors are 
“enforceability of awards”, “avoiding specific legal systems,” followed by 
“flexibility” and “selection of arbitrators”. In other words, the choice to resolve 
disputes in a third, neutral forum and the binding decisions are what makes 
international arbitration, or ISDS, become indispensable. 
If we take a broader look, we can see that stakeholders in ISDS have 
more to tell. According to OECD survey, investors-claimants range from 
“individuals with quite limited international experience” to small, medium, 
large and major multi-national enterprises.33  
In our view, ICSID benefits both investors and host States. First of all, 
ISDS benefits investors who are disadvantaged at a biased domestic court or 
                                                
31 Gary Clyde Hufbauer, ‘Investor-State dispute settlement’, in Trans-Pacific Partnership: An 
assessment, Volume 104 of Policy Analyses in International Economics, Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs and 
Jeffrey J.Schott, July 2016, Peterson Institute for International Economics.  
32 PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) and Queen Mary, University of London, ‘2015 International 
Arbitration: Improvements and innovations in International Arbitration’, 
http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/164761.pdf The Survey had conducted a survey every two 
years since 2006, and also in 2013, 2015, giving insights to international arbitration in the real 
business world. Their research take more than 700 corporations/ respondents, stakeholders in 
international arbitration at many levels, into account to find out about their choices, their preferences 
and attitude regard to dispute settlement. 
33 OECD (n 3). The survey based on 50 ICSID cases and for 45 UNCITRAL cases.  
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protective policy in the host States that they conduct investment34. If before, 
investors can only seek help at national courts, and lack of protection of rights, 
not to mention some domestic legislation are accompanied with political 
lobbying and corruption; now with ISDS mechanism, they are given a chance to 
side-step what may be incompetent and choose what best advantaged for them. 
This key advancement of ISDS in international investment, however, also raised 
some questions about the equality between standards of protection for foreign 
investors and those that apply to domestic investors. If a foreign investor can 
bring a claim against a state for compensation when their investment is 
mistreated, domestic investor cannot do so. This issue, thus, leave the room for 
improvement in each state’s legislation.  
ISDS can also generate benefits for host states as well. Given the 
arbitration tool to protect investors’ rights and benefits, investors would feel 
more secured to do business even if host states’ regulation has limitations and 
from that host states can attract more investment. Moreover, the rapid 
development of ISDS creates pressure to reform domestic conflicts resolution 
procedures, otherwise, states would have to spend much of time and resources 
in political resolution of investment and trade disputes. The pressure of 
monetary compensation for investors pursuant to rendered award can urge host 
states to improve domestic judicial practices to be in line with international 
standards. An alternative view is that ISDS does have negative effects. The fact 
that foreign investors are granted a “privilege” unavailable to domestic ones 
“exposes” domestic Government (of the host State) to the risk of being 
challenged and sued against for compensation by foreign nationals. State 
sovereignty and public interest regulations should never be questioned, and 
ISDS appears to be superior to national domestic laws. The mere fact that 
foreign investors can challenge a governmental policy before a tribunal that is 
                                                
34 David Gaukrodger, Kathryn Gordon, OECD Working Papers on International Investment 2012/03, 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A scoping paper for the investment policy. 
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outside the domestic court systems, then three arbitrators of the tribunal aboard 
can order the Government of host State pay reimbursement to the investor is 
arguable35.  
Regard to international investment promotion of nations 
Figure 1.3 Basis of consent invoked to establish ICSID jurisdiction in 
new cases registered in FY2016 under the ICSID Convention and 
Additional Facility rules        
 
(Source: ICSID Annual Report 2016) 
Via the basis of consent invoked to establish ICSID jurisdiction in new 
cases registered in fiscal year 2016, we can notice that the most major part of 
the cases invoked ICSID jurisdiction are from bilateral or multilateral 
investment treaties, up to 51% of the consent basis. Cases stem from investment 
law of host-state and investment contract cases take the percentage of 10 and 6 
respectively. This ratio somehow reflects a dispensable part of ISDS provisions 
in IIAs. There are total 3324 IIAs worldwide, including 2363 BITs in force and 
                                                
35 Scott Miller, Gregory N.Hicks, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Reality check, A Report of the 
CSIS Scholl Chair in International Business, Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), 
January 2015. 
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309 TIPs in force36. If we take a look at the world largest economy – the United 
States37 – they have included investment chapters in nearly all of its 20 FTAs to 
promote their investment aboard. In other words, a principal goal of IIAs is to 
promote investment and ISDS provisions are crucial tool to support. Even 
though there is a common belief that ISDS provisions benefits developing 
countries more than what it does to developed countries in IIA relationship, this 
is still an international playground and the measure is open for every country to 
access and make use of.  
Figure 1.4 Number of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) case, 1987, 1993-
2017 
 
                                                
36 UNCTAD (n 12)  
37	Over the past decades, only 16 ISDS cases have been brought against the United States while US 
investors are ahead of the curve with 148 ISDS cases as claimants. And among those 16 cases, United 
States has not lost in any cases as the country is advanced in developing legislation on investment to 
create a friendly business environment.	
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Figure 1.5 World FDI inflow 2005-2016, and projections 2017-2018 (billions of 
dollars and per cent)  
 
Figure 1.6 Trends in IIAs signed 1980 - 2016 
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Gary Clyde Hufbauer drew the attention to the relevant among three elements: 
number of ISDS cases, FDI, and number of BITs concluded.38 Looking at Figure 
1.4 and Figure 1.5, we can see that the number of ISDS cases worldwide has 
steadily grown and in analogous pattern of rise with FDI and number of 
cumulative number of IIAs, especially in the period 2005-2016. Since 2005, 
although the world’s total FDI inflows fluctuates, it shows a general upward 
trend from 1100 billion $ to 1746 billion $ (Figure 1.5). The number of IIAs 
also rose from 2,506 agreements in 2005 up to total 3,324 agreements (2957 
BITs and 367 TIPs) in 201639 (Figure 1.6). Since the beginning of 2017, there 
are 11 IIAs signed (7 BITs and 4 TIPs), in which one TIP between China and 
Hong Kong entered into force in this June. The statistics of new treaty-based 
ISDS cases continues unabated: 77 initiated cases in 2015, 69 cases initiated in 
2016, and 35 new cases in the first 7 months of 2017, bringing the total number 
of known treaty-based ISDS cases to 817 as of 31 July 2017. Since this is just 
the number for known cases, due to the nature of confidentiality of ISDS 
                                                
38 Gary Clyde Hufbauer (n 31) 
39 UNCTAD (n 12) 
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arbitration, the actual hidden number of investor-State disputes must be higher. 
In words of Gary Hufbauer, more FDI certainly creates “more opportunities for 
friction between firms and states, and the growing number of ISDS cases simply 
tracks a world economy in which BITs and FTAs are designed both to entice 
FDI and to ensure fair play thereafter”.  
 
 
 
Part 2. EU proposal for an international investment court 
1.  The trend of a multilateral investment court system (ICS): TTIP, 
CETA 
Apart from the two popular types of arbitral options for ISDS which are 
institutional arbitration and ad hoc arbitration as introduced in the first part of 
this paper, today public attention is drawn to a new permanent investment court 
system that the Commission of EU is introducing in their recently negotiating 
trade deals: The CETA with Canada, the TTIP with the US and later the 
EVFTA with Vietnam (they are also known as the ‘new generation’ trade 
deals). This new mechanism is expected to replace and reform the traditional 
arbitration-based system and improve certain limitations that it has long 
received. This second part of the paper aims to deliver some highlights of this 
new investment court in EU’s ongoing trade deals: TTIP40 EU proposal, CETA 
and mainly focused on EVFTA. 
The EU and Canada have signed the trade agreement at the end of 
October 2016, and The European Parliament has voted in favour on 15 February 
                                                
40	Hereafter in this paper, TTIP is referred to the EU’s proposal for TTIP and there is no assurance 
that the US is going to accept it; the negotiation is still in the process.	
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2017 but that does not mean CETA is a done deal. A noteworthy point about 
CETA is that after a month since the final text of the EU-Vietnam FTA was 
released, CETA immediately dropped in the new ICS to replace its traditional 
ISDS mechanism41, similar to the TTIP EU proposal, whereas CETA text was 
already finalized and in the process of legal revision. Public did not be aware of 
this amendment during the process. The ICS belongs to the exclusions from 
provisional application of CETA, which means now CETA must go through the 
final stage of ratification before fully entering into force. It must be approved by 
all EU national parliaments according to their respective domestic constitutional 
requirements – that would make CETA a mixed agreement42. However, if 
CETA is supposed to be a mixed agreement that needs all Member States 
approval to ratify, a ‘provisional application’ of an agreement before it has been 
approved might facilitate circumvent democracy. For TTIP EU proposal, the 
negotiation is still in progress; but according to the limited available TTIP 
chapters as EU’s proposal, the function, constitution and operation of ICS are 
basically regulated similarly among these three trade deals.  
At US market, currently EU is the biggest investor with investments 
value of more than € 1.6 trillion. Now EU is making efforts in ensuring a level 
playing field and providing more certainty for both EU and US investors. This 
helps EU to attract investment from US and remain competitive internationally 
as well. Under both TTIP EU proposal and CETA, the negative perception of 
foreign investor is blurred as some fundamental guarantees are provided to both 
side, such as no discrimination on the grounds of investors’ nationality, gender, 
                                                
41 European Commission Press Release of 29 February 2016 
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-399_en.htm   
42 An EU-only agreement enters into force straight after the European Parliament gives its approval 
while mixed agreements enter into force only once each individual EU country has approved it. Each 
country's approval procedures may take several years, so in the meantime EU governments can decide 
in the EU Council to provisionally apply the agreement ('provisional application'). The main 
exclusions from provisional application of CETA are: investment protection; investment market 
access for portfolio investment (except market access for FDI); the Investment Court System; an 
article on camcording.  
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race or religious beliefs; no expropriation of investors’ assets (e.g. by 
nationalization without compensation, etc.  
TTIP EU proposal, CETA and EVFTA both emphasize on the fair and 
equitable treatment as a standard of investment protection. This is an 
advancement since fair and equitable has been identified by some as one of the 
elements of the minimum standard of treatment of foreigners and of their 
property, required by customary international law43. Investors are under no 
circumstance should be denied a possibility to bring a legitimate claim to the 
courts of the host country. A denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative 
proceedings is a breach of the obligation of fair and equitable treatment to 
investors as regulated in TTIP EU proposal44 and in CETA45. The TTIP EU 
proposal even goes more detailed than CETA that it stated “obstacles to 
effective access to justice” is included as a breach of due process. The treaty 
allows an investor to bring a claim the Investment Court in case there is a 
breach of one or more of the listed obligations which shall be reviewed 
regularly by both sides of the agreements. The Committee on Services and 
Investment, established under CETA, takes charge of developing 
recommendations in this regard, and they will submit recommendations to 
CETA Joint Committee for final decision. However, the approach to “fair and 
equitable” in form of a “closed” list that exists in TTIP proposal, CETA and 
even EVFTA is arguable:  
“A Party breaches the obligation of fair and equitable treatment […] 
where a measure or a series of measures constitutes:  
(a) denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; or  
                                                
43 “Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law”, OECD Working Papers 
on International Investment, 2004/03, OECD Publishing. 
44	Article 3.2, Section 2, Chapter II, TTIP 
45 Article 8.10, para 2, Section D, Chapter 8 CETA 
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(b) fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach 
of transparency and obstacles to effective access to justice, in judicial 
and administrative proceedings; or  
(c) manifest arbitrariness; or  
(d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as 
gender, race or religious belief; or  
(e) harassment, coercion, abuse of power or similar bad faith conduct; or  
(f) a breach of any further elements of the fair and equitable treatment 
obligation adopted by the Parties in accordance with paragraph 3 of this 
Article.” 46 
Above is the list of prohibitions regards to fair and equitable treatment in TTIP 
EU proposal text. CETA and EVFTA provide mostly similarly. Adding the 
word “constitute” means measures that breach fair and equitable standard 
obligation are defined and limited to what only falls within the list. This 
limitation could result in the fact that there might be some measure that does not 
belong to the list, but still cause an unfair and discriminative treatment between 
domestic investors and investors of the other Party. In contrast, the draft text of 
TPP - in which used to include the U.S, and Canada was curiously absence in 
the most recent meeting about TPP at the side-line of APEC 2017 trade talks – 
provide a more “open” definition of fair and equitable treatment: 
“fair and equitable treatment” includes the obligation not to deny justice 
in criminal, civil or administrative adjudicatory proceedings in 
accordance with the principle of due process embodied in the principal 
legal systems of the world…” 
The word “include” implies that the following listed obligations are inter alia, 
not only limited to what are mentioned in the provision, which probably is a 
better use. TPP draft text also sets the fair and equitable treatment provision in a 
form of just “minimum standard of treatment” for investors, which means 
                                                
46 Article 3.2, Section 2, Chapter II, TTIP European Commission draft text  
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member States must treat investors at least at that standard, and they are 
encouraged to offer more.  
A noteworthy point is that the EVFTA lists the breach of obligation to 
treat just slightly different: without “a fundamental breach of transparency”47, 
while TTIP EU proposal and CETA provide that a breach of transparency 
constitutes a breach of fair and equitable treatment obligation. Vietnam has been 
recognized for having low records in transparency, according to the World 
Economic Forum. In annual reports for competitiveness in 137 economies 
around the world, in the past two years Vietnam has been ranked quite low, at 
88th in 2016 and 82nd in 2017 out of 137 economies, in terms of transparency in 
public policy making48. Given Vietnam’s established reputation for weak 
performance in transparency, could this be construed that the EU is easier on 
Vietnam with looser regulation on transparency than on the U.S and Canada, 
who is famous for efficiency of legal regime?  
EU’s agreements limit the grounds on which investors can challenge a 
state that only claims relating to non-discriminatory treatment and investment 
protection provisions can be submitted to the ICS49. Firms would not be able to 
sue governments just because their profits are affected. They will have to 
provide sufficient law and factual basis to demonstrate that a public authority 
has breached the provisions in agreements. Both CETA and TTIP EU proposal 
include articles that preserve fully the right of governments to regulate in public 
interest50. This clarifies that a measure that may negatively affect an investment 
or affect an investor’s expectations of profits is not inconsistent with the 
agreement for that reason alone. Such vigilant regulation can help public bodies 
avoid being forced to change legislation or pay damages. CETA even forms a 
                                                
47 Article 14.2, Section 2, Chapter 8 EVFTA  
48 World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2016-2017; and World Economic Forum, 
Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018. 
49 Article 8.18, Section F, CETA and Article 1, Section 3, Chapter 8, TTIP. 
50 Article 8.9, Section D, CETA and Article 2, Section 2, Chapter 8, TTIP.	
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system that allows the Court to issue fast-track rulings51. These provisions can 
save a lot of time while the Tribunal can dismiss frivolous or unfounded claims 
in a matter of weeks. 
v Composition of the ICS:  
In terms of organizational structure, the court is a two-tier system that 
comprises of a Tribunal (of First Instance) and an Appeals Tribunal. However, 
the number of tribunal system provided among TIIP EU proposal, CETA and 
EVFTA is different.  
For TTIP EU proposal, the tribunal has 15 judges52, quite a large number 
indicating the big scope of member states involved, five of EU nationals, five of 
US nationals and five nationals of third countries). A division of three judges – 
one EU judge, one US judge and one judge from a third country – is assigned to 
hear case. This division is appointed randomly on a rotation basis to ensure their 
equal opportunity to serve and fairness. CETA provides for a similar number of 
Tribunal members, with five members being nationals of Canada, five members 
being EU nationals, and the remaining five members are third country 
nationals53. The appointment of Tribunal members is entirely undertaken by a 
specialized committee, consists of representatives from Parties and established 
under the agreement. Under TTIP it is the Service and Investment Committee 
and under CETA, it is the CETA Joint Committee.  
For TTIP EU proposal, the Appeals Tribunal composes of six judges (two 
EU nationals, two US nationals and two nationals of other countries)54. The EU 
and US propose three candidates respectively (two nationals of their own and 
one non-national). The tenure for judges in Appeals Tribunal, and its hearing 
division is similar to the regulations for the Tribunal. For CETA, the number of 
                                                
51 Articles 8.32 and Article 8.33, Section F, Chapter 8, CETA 
52 Article 9, Section 3 Chapter II. Investment, TTIP Agreement 
53 Art. 8.27, para. 2, respective Art. 8.28, para. 7, Section F, CETA 
54 Article 10, Section 3 Chapter II,  TTIP Agreement	
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members of Appeals Tribunal is yet to be determined55. There is little guidance 
on the constitution and operation of Appellate Tribunal. Administrative and 
organizational matters regarding the functioning of the Appellate Tribunal shall 
have to wait for further decision from the CETA Joint Committee in the coming 
time. So far, we just know that the division of “three randomly appointed 
Members of Appellate Tribunal” shall hear the appeal. The Appellate Tribunal 
will review decisions of the Tribunal and the grounds for reviewing awards are 
clearly defined in both agreements.  
However, the number for members of Tribunal in ICS between EU and 
Vietnam is completely different: only 9 members. Detailed contents of ICS 
Tribunal in EVFTA will be discussed afterwards, but first looking at the overall 
quantities of members in these three Tribunals, we notice an inconsistency 
across EU’s proposals.  
TTIP EU Proposal CETA EVFTA 
15 judges of Tribunal, 6 
judges of Appeals 
Tribunal. 
15 members of Tribunal, 
for Appeals Tribunal is 
not yet determined.  
9 members of Tribunal, 6 
members of Appeals 
Tribunal. 
 
A question raised is that why Tribunal in the FTA with Vietnam is so much 
fewer than with Canada and the U.S. A reasonable way to look at a scope of an 
institution is based on the scope of population of the country it is placed, but in 
respect to population, Vietnam has population of 92 million while Canada has 
only more than 32 million population56, so this explanation is not satisfying. 
Would the quantity represent a distinction hidden between developing and 
developed country, or an assumption that Canadian and the U.S investors might 
use the Tribunal more frequently? 
                                                
55  Art. 8.28, Section F, Chapter 8, CETA 
56 The popluation was in 2016, according to data source of World Bank. 
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The tenure of elected judges is long – six years, and there are seven 
judges who “appointed immediately after the entry into force of the Agreement, 
to be determined by lot”, shall hold the chairs for nine years. In contrast to a 
tribunal panel that happens ‘ad hoc’, this fixed long-term position can raise 
concern about the independence and politicization of the court.   
The number of Tribunal members is not yet explained, but this two-tier 
system is a clear break from a standard arbitration practice which empowers the 
investor and the state involved to actively nominate the arbitrators who would 
hear their cases. 
 
v Standards requirement for members of ICS 
  There are certain standards for eligibility of judges in ICS. Members of 
tribunals shall possess the qualifications required in their respective countries 
for judicial offices while for members of Appeal tribunals it should be 
equivalent to the highest judicial offices. Rules on ethics are provided: 
“They shall not be affiliated with any government. They shall not take 
instructions from any government or organisation with regard to matters 
related to the dispute. They shall not participate in the consideration of any 
disputes that would create a direct or indirect conflict of interest. In so doing 
they shall comply with Annex II (Code of Conduct). In addition, upon 
appointment, they shall refrain from acting as counsel in any pending or new 
investment protection dispute under this or any other agreement or domestic 
law.”57  	
Pursuant to TTIP, to maintain such ‘beyond doubt’ independence, a judge 
in Tribunal receives a monthly retainer fee which is suggested to be around only 
one third of the retainer fee for WTO Appellate Body members (i.e. around € 
2000 per month). It is questionable whether this small amount is enough to 
guarantee the independence, not to mention that the judges must be available at 
                                                
57 Article 11, Section 3, TTIP 
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all times, even in short notice, and stay updated with dispute settlement 
activities under the agreement. According to CETA, no specific amount of 
retainer fees is mentioned yet, but those shall be determined pursuant to 
Regulation 14.1 of the Administrative and Financial Regulations of the ICSID 
Convention. 
 
2. A look at the investment court in EVFTA 
After CETA and TTIP, the EU-Vietnam FTA (EVFTA) contributes to 
EU’s roadmap to reform investment protection. The EU even commented the 
agreement with Vietnam as “the most ambitious and comprehensive FTA that 
the EU has ever concluded with a developing country”. Not only issues in trade, 
but ISDS is also tackled. The ICS is proposed in EVFTA and both of these three 
treaties include an article saying that the Parties shall share the objective of 
pursuing with other trading partners the establishment of a multilateral 
investment court for the resolution of investment disputes. The EVFTA were 
substantially concluded in 2015 and expected to come into effect in 2018. The 
ICS of the EVFTA is basically outlined similar to TTIP EU proposal and 
CETA’s. Overall, the court is regarded as having certain improvements over the 
existing WTO dispute settlement but at the same time still remains certain 
concerns and criticism against.  
v Right to regulate:  
As in the TTIP proposal and the CETA, EU’s agreement with Vietnam 
includes an Article about regulatory measures as a safeguard for governments' 
right to regulate. Since it is unsure to know if whether the U.S is going to accept 
EU proposal or not, we shall compare the Right to regulate article between 
EVFTA and CETA. 
EVFTA 
Article 13bis: Investment and 
CETA 
Article 8.9:  Investment and regulatory 
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regulatory measures/objectives measures 
1. The Parties reaffirm the right to 
regulate within their territories to achieve 
legitimate policy objectives, such as the 
protection of public health, safety, 
environment or public morals, social or 
consumer protection or promotion and 
protection of cultural diversity. 
 
 
2. For greater certainty, the provisions of 
this section shall not be interpreted as a 
commitment from a Party that it will not 
change the legal and regulatory 
framework, including in a manner that 
may negatively affect the operation of 
covered investments or the investor’s 
expectations of profits. 
[…] 
1. For the purpose of this Chapter, the 
Parties reaffirm their right to regulate 
within their territories to achieve 
legitimate policy objectives, such as the 
protection of public health, safety, the 
environment or public morals, social or 
consumer protection or the promotion and 
protection of cultural diversity. 
 
2. For greater certainty, the mere fact that 
a Party regulates, including through a 
modification to its laws, in a manner 
which negatively affects an investment or 
interferes with an investor’s expectations, 
including its expectations of profits, does 
not amount to a breach of an obligation 
under this Section. 
[…] 
 
Although the expression between two Articles is not exactly the same, 
but their nature is alike: stipulating that a claim for compensation shall not be 
made against a legitimate governmental action for public interests. In both 
agreements, it is not in the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to determine the legality 
of a measure, under the domestic law of the disputing party (this will be 
discussed in the following part). However, first and foremost, in EVFTA text, it 
is said ‘the’ right to regulate while in CETA the words are changed to ‘their’ 
right to regulate. One might interpret here that it implies Canada has had their 
right to rule already established, claimed, and recognized, and now Vietnam is 
just being allowed to rule in its territories, not sure if that authority is 
acknowledged to belongs to Vietnam by international. 
In EVFTA, Article 13b clearly reaffirms that governments' right to 
regulate within their territories for legitimate policy objectives is fully 
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preserved. Legitimate policy objectives must fall within the scope of public 
interests such as “health, safety, environment or public morals, social or 
consumer protection or promotion and protection of cultural diversity”. The 
article clarifies that investment protection provisions cannot be interpreted as a 
commitment by governments not to change their laws in the future, even if there 
is a manner may negatively affect the investor’s expectations of profits. The 
approach of right to regulate is pretty new in IIA; Vietnam has never 
particularly included in its signed IIA before such a clause specifically 
preserving its right to rule. This regulatory measure provision might help to 
avoid the abuse of ICS in the future and help the agreement to create a balance 
between investment protection and autonomy. 
However, in our opinion overall the approach of the right to regulate for 
benefits of public is too subjective and leaves too much flexibility. A better way 
to look at it is a state’s regulations must be consistent with its obligations under 
the treaty. Necessary measures for public welfare are measures that serve the 
state’s obligations. Thus, saying a mere fact of changing a law, including a 
manner that affect negatively investors’ expectations of profits does not amount 
to a breach of obligation under this provision is not enough. Furthermore, the 
fact that this naïve approach is combined with the exhaustive list of FET 
violations clearly favours the States against investors’ expectations. 
 
v Applicable law & rules of interpretation:	 
Apart from the structure and wordings of the text, the provisions for 
Applicable law and interpretation are generally similar between the EVFTA 
(Article 16) and CETA (Article 8.31), with some minor differences. 
EVFTA 
Article 16: Applicable law and rules of 
interpretation 
CETA 
Article 8.31: Applicable law and 
interpretation 
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- The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction 
to question the legality of a measure, 
alleged to constitute a breach of this 
Agreement, under the domestic law of 
the disputing Party (para.2). 
- determine whether the measures in 
question are inconsistent with Article 
1.1(Scope) (para.1) 
- similar to EVFTA (para.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
- similar to EVFTA (para.2) 
Applicable laws in rendering decisions: 
- This Agreement, 
- other rules or principles of international 
law applicable between EU and 
Vietnam, 
- and take into consideration domestic law 
of disputing parties as a matter of fact 
(para.2) 
Applicable laws in rendering decisions: 
- this Agreement  
- other rules and principles of 
international law applicable between 
EU and Canada (para.1) 
*Domestic law may be considered, as 
appropriate, as a matter of fact while 
determining the consistency of a measure. 
Interpretation of domestic law: carried by 
the courts and binding to the Tribunal, not 
vice versa (para.2) 
Interpretation of the Agreement: shall be 
in accordance with customary rules of 
interpretation of public international law, 
as codified in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties (para.3). 
Interpretation of domestic law: 
similar to the EVFTA (para.2) 
 
Interpretation of the Agreement: 
similar to the EVFTA (para.1) 
 
Under both agreements, determining whether a measure under domestic 
law is legal remains the monopoly of the government of Parties to the 
Agreement. As a safeguard, the reason for this is to permit the Parties to control 
and influence the interpretation of the agreement.  
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When adjudicating and rendering its decision, the Tribunal shall apply the 
agreement in accordance with the principles of international law applicable 
between the Parties. A difference between the EVFTA and CETA is that: in 
EVFTA, the Tribunal shall take into consideration the relevant domestic law of 
disputing party as a matter of fact. While in CETA, the domestic law is 
probably considered in appropriate circumstances for determining the 
consistency of measure with CETA; in other words, the domestic law of 
disputing parties in CETA is not used in the process of rendering decisions by 
the Tribunal. 
In both agreements, the Tribunal shall use the interpretation of domestic 
laws of disputing parties given by the domestic courts of that parties. 
Interpretation of domestic law given by the courts or authorities who are 
competent to interpret is binding upon the Tribunal, but any meaning given to 
the relevant domestic law made by the Tribunal is not binding upon the courts 
and the authorities of either Party.  
 
 
v Submission of a claim 
The EVFTA regulates the obligation of ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and 
‘full protection and security’ as a standard treatment of investment for parties. 
Basically, one can submit a claim while there is a measure undertaken by a 
Party that breach either Section 2 (Investment protection) or Section 1 (national 
treatment, MFN treatment) that allegedly causes loss or damage to the claimant. 
To avoid parallel claims, a claimant may not submit a claim if the claimant has 
a pending claim before any other domestic or international court concerning the 
same measure. 	
 
v Conducts of proceedings 
 36 
EVFTA incorporates the UNCITRAL Rules on transparency. 
Accordingly, all documents – including submissions by the parties to a dispute, 
and the tribunal’s decisions – shall be available to public. However, compared 
to the Transparency of proceedings provision in CETA, the EVFTA is still 
loose and has not achieved far reaching in transparency. Under CETA, all 
hearings are open to public58. So far in Vietnam there is no such access to 
documents of a proceeding or access by the public to hearings. This practice 
does not help either Vietnamese investors or government well prepared in 
lawsuit and ready for international competitive market.  
v Composition of the court 
A Tribunal panel for first instance of conventional ISDS by arbitration, in 
ICSID proceedings for example, normally includes three members. Specifically, 
each party will appoint two names, one for arbitrator of their choice and one for 
proposed President of the tribunal. And the appointed arbitrator must not have 
the same nationality to either of the two parties59. If they cannot reach 
consensus on such issue, arbitrators of Tribunal will be chosen by the Council 
for them. This constitution of tribunal can be understood as based on the 
appointment that totally excluded the factor of nationality. The EVFTA offers 
differently. The Tribunal includes 9 members, in which 3 members shall be 
nationals of each party (in this case, Vietnam and member states of the EU) and 
the remaining are nationals of third countries. The Tribunal then hear the cases 
in division of three which shall be chaired by a member who is a national of 
third country.60 The Appeals Tribunal consists of six members, with similar 
regulation for the ratio of nationality of members.61 This even categorization 
based on the affiliation to the parties is also proceeded in TTIP EU proposal and 
CETA agreements. These EU’s agreements keep the factor of nationality for 
                                                
58 Article 8.36, CETA 
59 Article 37.2 (b) Arbitral rules, ICSID Convention 
60 Art. 12 para 6, Section 3, Chapter 8, EVFTA 
61 Article 13, Section 3, Chapter 8 EVFTA	
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favour of parties in its regulation but leave all matters regards the appointment 
to specialized committee (in EVFTA it is the Trade Committee, upon 
recommendation of the Committee on Services, Investment and Government 
Procurement 62). Moreover, only in EVFTA, the possibility of disputing parties 
proposing members of tribunal as the precedent regulation in conventional 
ICSID is remained but modified as another alternative63.  
By eliminating the participation of the disputing parties on the 
nomination of a particular panel, the ICS responds to frequent criticism over the 
influence of investors over the arbitration process. This approach is generally 
welcomed as a reformative feature compared to the traditional ISDS system, but 
on the other hand, having the Parties choosing panel judges in advance, inserts a 
significant element of political influence – counteracting the objective of 
depoliticization that ISDS was designed to achieve.  
 
 
v Standards requirement for members of the ICS 
Stricter requirement of independence and integrity expresses a 
demanding requirement from the European Commission but somehow slightly 
ambiguous. Beside possession of required qualifications in respective countries 
for appointment to judicial offices, or be jurist of recognised competence,64 
members must have demonstrated expertise in public international law in order 
to become eligible. Expertise in international investment law, international trade 
law, and international dispute resolution is ideal. Nevertheless, any 
measurement to demonstrate such expertise is not suggested. Notably, members 
of Appeal Tribunal must meet the qualifications requirement to be appointed to 
                                                
62 Art. 34.2 EVFTA.  
63 Footnote 25 and 26, EVFTA.  
64 Art. 12, para. 4, EVFTA 
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the “highest judicial office” as regulated in their respective countries, which 
implies an even higher threshold. This seems to imply that members of 
Appellate Tribunal are more qualified/expert at delivering judgement. Another 
issue is that there are definitely differences among member states of EU and 
Vietnam regarding the qualifications for judicial offices.  
The EVFTA has devoted article 14 and Annex II-chapter 13 to stipulate 
for Ethics issue. The first ethical criteria for members of the Tribunal and the 
Appeal Tribunal is that their independence is “beyond doubt”, which means 
they must not be affiliated with any government and do not participate in any 
disputes that would create a direct or indirect conflict of interest. Once 
appointed into Tribunal panel, they shall stop any other business, in which their 
roles are counsels, experts or witnesses, that related to either party’s new or 
pending investment disputes under this or any other agreement or domestic law.  
v An appeals mechanism 
The unavailable opportunity for a substantive review of tribunal’s awards 
in traditional ISD judicial proceedings has long received controversial opinions 
from legal community. Under ICSID framework, there is an annulment 
committee and grounds to annul are limited. With the ICS, Vietnamese and the 
EU investors as credit debtor can have a chance to challenge the tribunal award 
which becomes only provisional award and not yet a final one. The grounds to 
appeal the tribunal award are: 
(a) that the Tribunal has erred in the interpretation or application of the 
applicable law;  
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly erred in the appreciation of the facts, 
including the appreciation of relevant domestic law; or,  
(c) those provided for in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, in so far as 
they are not covered by (a) and (b).  
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The FTA with Vietnam provides competences for the Appeal Tribunal to 
“modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions” of the Tribunal, partially 
or in toto.65 Only where the facts of the case do not allow for a final decision to 
be taken is the matter to be referred back to the Tribunal.66  
The Tribunal renders only monetary damages and any applicable interest 
as compensation for the loss suffered by the claimant, not punitive damages 
because the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to judge a measure of a 
government is legal or not, so the ICS does not have effect of repeal of a 
measure. This means that a measure, even though severely negatively affect an 
investor’s business, cannot be stopped or repealed. All what the wronged party 
can get is receiving compensation for their losses. 
The Tribunal shall issue a provisional award within 18 months since 
submission of the claim, then after 90 days if there is no disputing party 
appealed, the provisional award become final. 
 
v Enforcement of awards 
According to Article 31 of EVFTA, the final awards issued by the ICS 
shall be binding between the disputing parties. Both Vietnam and the EU 
governments shall recognize the rendered award and enforce it as if it were a 
final judgement of a court in its authority. Once being ‘final’, rendered awards 
of ICS pursuant this Agreement shall not be appealed, reviewed, set aside or 
annulled67. Notably, the Agreement gives Vietnam a period of 5 years, since its 
entry into force, to prepare for transition with the new tribunal system before 
Vietnam has to comply with the enforcement of binding awards in respect of 
disputes where Vietnam is a respondent. During this period of 5 years, the 
recognition and enforcement of a final award in respect of a dispute where 
                                                
65 Art. 28, para. 3, EVFTA; a decision of the Appeal Tribunal is considered final in accordance with 
Art. 29, para. 3, EVFTA.  
66 Art. 28, para. 4, EVFTA.  
67 Article 31, EVFTA. 
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Vietnam is the respondent shall be conducted pursuant to the New York 
Convention. 
Another worthy of note is the final paragraph in this Article which states 
that final award issued by the Tribunal shall qualify as an ICSID award. This 
leads us to a question: Is ICS final award truly equivalent to ICSID final award? 
A distinctive feature of ICSID award is its ‘automatic’ enforcement. By 
‘automatic’ it means all ICSID final awards shall be recognized by all state 
parties to the ICSID Convention and enforced as if it were a final judgment of a 
court in that state68.  In other words, if a party to the proceeding fails to comply 
with the ICSID award at his State, the other party can seek remedy elsewhere in 
other Contracting States of the Convention; he can bring the pecuniary 
obligations to any ICSID Member states to have them recognized an enforced in 
their domestic courts as if it were a final judgment of that State’s courts. 
However, saying ICS Tribunal’s award is considered an ICSID award is highly 
subjective and irrelevant. An arbitral award rendered by the ICS of EVFTA, 
between an EU and Vietnamese disputing parties is an issue upon the free trade 
agreement between the EU and Vietnam. A court in Norway, or Switzerland, or 
Turkey, for example, has no responsibility to recognize and enforce pecuniary 
obligations for a dispute between EU and Vietnamese parties. 
Article 12 referring to a possibility of a multilateral dispute settlement 
mechanism seems to serve EU’s intention to fix the problem mentioned above. 
However, the obligation under the ICSID Convention is open to debate because 
other international treaties governing arbitration such as the NYC 1958 or the 
Panama Convention still leave room for a level of domestic court’s review with 
limited grounds in setting-aside proceedings to ensure the award is consistent to 
its public policy. Thus, establishment of a multilateral investment court with 
same ICSID automatic enforcement regime is highly questionable. 
                                                
68	Article 54, ICSID Convention 	
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Comments on the ICS 
Indeed, the ICS resolve limitations that the traditional ISDS arbitration 
system did not, such as the ‘forum shopping’ capacity where an investor goes to 
a court where they think they're most likely to win. ICS allows judges to dismiss 
claims early on if they consider them to be unfounded, saving more time and 
cost because it requires the lost party in case to bear all costs of hearings (the 
loser pays principle) to deter the investors from making frivolous claims in the 
first place. The judges or tribunal members are prohibited from acting as 
counsel in investment cases, which removes the so-called ‘double hat’ problem 
in ISDS. Nevertheless, the ICS receives a wave of oppose for other reasons. 
Civil society mainly concerns that whether there is a need for such special 
investor protection. A foreign investor can seek fairness and equitable treatment 
but at the same time the door is opened for firms to sue against State as well 
with no other way around. It can be affectious to public interest and taxpayers.   
Despite the same constitution and operation of the two-tier system 
including Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal, only the proposal of ICS in the TTIP 
agreement the word “court” is used in the heading. It uses the title “judges” for 
members of the First Instance Tribunal only (but not for the Appeal Tribunal). 
In the EVFTA and CETA neither the words “court” or “judges” are used, they 
name it ‘The Investment Tribunal System’ and ‘members’ of Tribunal, 
members of Appellate Tribunal. Questions rise about the purpose of naming the 
investment court differently among these agreements, whether an award of the 
investment court under these EU’s FTA is an arbitral award – which fall inside 
the scope of the New York Convention or it is a judicial judgement. Given the 
facts that the ICS relies on existing arbitration rules (including those of ICSID 
arbitration and UNCITRAL), and there is no permanent secretariat is created 
like a permanent judicial body, and the cost is mostly shared by the disputing 
parities. As stated in the EU-Vietnam agreement text, two parties shall 
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recognize and enforce the issued award as if it were a final judgement of a court 
in its authority. This removal of set-aside of awards appears to be dissonant 
with claims of increased public accountability made by the EU Commission and 
self-contradictory with the balance achieved between the autonomy of 
arbitration and the duty of control by States at the time of enforcement. This is 
going to be an issue for Vietnam - a developing country - in the context of a 
multilateral investment court in the future is not far-fetched. After the EVFTA 
comes into effect, EU firms can gain more impacts on equitisation of 
Vietnamese State-owned enterprises who for long get used to subsidy and 
monopoly in the market. EU firms will be able to bid for public contracts such 
as infrastructure, mineral sources, power distribution, public hospitals, etc.  
Whereas foreign investors are given elevated protection treatment, now it’s time 
for Vietnam to review and revise its legislation framework and prepare for the 
application of an investment court, and certainly likely a multilateral investment 
court in the future.  
 
 
Part 3. Recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards in Vietnam  
In its centenary conference in 2015, the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators 
(CIArb) introduced its CIArb Centenary London Conference Principles (the 
Principles), which are 10 principles described as those characteristics necessary 
for an effective, efficient and safe seat for the conduct of international 
commercial arbitration69. Similarity, in a survey of Queen Mary University, 
London with the White & Case Ltd70, the most important elements that explain 
                                                
69 The ten principles include: law, judiciary, legal expertise, education, right of representation, 
accessibility and safety, facilities, ethics, enforceability, immunity. http://www.ciarb.org/docs/default-
source/ciarbdocuments/london/the-principles.pdf?sfvrsn=4  
70	Queen Mary University of London (n 32)	
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the choice of seat of arbitration are local legal system, national arbitration law, 
track record for enforcing arbitral awards, availability of quality arbitrators, etc. 
In general, these elements for a safe and efficient platform for international 
dispute settlement can be classified into two main categories: domestic 
legislation environment and international influence on arbitration. 
 
 
 
1. Legislation  
In Vietnam, arbitration activities are governed by:  
a. The Law on Commercial Arbitration  
The main legislation governing the arbitration in Vietnam right now is The Law 
on Commercial Arbitration No. 54/2010/ QH12 (hereafter the LCA) which was 
ratified by National Assembly on June 17th 2010, taking effect since 1st January 
2011. Arbitration activities in Vietnam are at early developing stage and do not 
have a long-founded background. There has no legal text that stipulates 
arbitration yet until 2003 with the introduction of the Ordinance on Commercial 
Arbitration (Ordinance No.08/2003/PL-UBTVQH11) and the LCA in 2011 is to 
replace it. This was indeed a remarkable first step for Vietnam in strengthening 
legal framework for constitution and operation of arbitration activities in 
Vietnam. The LCA makes efforts to bring arbitration in Vietnam in line with 
the international practice. The law of Vietnam adopts fundamental principles of 
dispute settlement by arbitration from the UNCITRAL Model Law of 2006, 
with some differences.  
 The Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration was firstly 
adopted by the UNCITRAL in 1985, with amendments in 2006; it serves 
UNCITRAL’s objective to constitute a harmonized basis for States in 
establishing their arbitration laws. It covers comprehensive aspects of 
 44 
arbitration from procedures to recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. 
The UNCITRAL Model Law is neither an actual law or a binding convention, 
but it appears as a prototype of law, a suggested legal framework for States 
around the world to adopt; States are encouraged to incorporate the Model Law 
into their legal system and make a few changes as possible, to increase the 
likelihood of achieving a harmonization in international arbitration, to decrease 
the variations among legal systems, in the interest of the users of international 
arbitration71.  Fundamental principles of UNCITRAL include: 
(i) Independence of arbitration agreement: Article 7 as amended in 2006 
confirms the validity and effect of an arbitration agreement to resolve any arisen 
disputes or disputes may arise in the future in any form (written or oral) as long 
as the content of consensus is recorded. Article 16 affirms the independence 
arbitration agreement. It means that an arbitration clause shall be treated 
separately as an independent agreement of the other terms of the contract. “A 
decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail 
ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause” (Article 5, Model Law 2006)  
(ii) Delimitation of court intervention: Courts’ involvement in arbitration 
is defined and limited through a group of articles in the Model Law, regarding 
issues of appointment, challenge of arbitrators, evidence collecting, interim 
measures, etc. In short, apart from the authorized duties regulated in the Model 
Law, “no court shall intervene, in matters governed by this Law” (Article 5). 
The supervision and assistance of courts are very necessary, but the fact that 
parties agreed to arbitrate means they have a consensus to exclude court 
intervention in the dispute and their arbitral proceedings should be protected 
from disruptive court interference. Both this principle and the principle above 
about independence of arbitration agreement reflects that the parties’ choice to 
use arbitration must be respected.  
                                                
71	Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the 1985 Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration as amended in 2006, http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/ml-
arb/MLARB-explanatoryNote20-9-07.pdf 	
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(iii) Competence-competence: or internationally known as the 
“Kompetenz-Kompetenz” principle, which means the competence to rule on its 
own jurisdiction. Accordingly, arbitral tribunal are competent to determine its 
own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or 
validity of the arbitration agreement, without having to resort to a court.  
(iv) Fundamental procedural rights of a party: This principle means that 
the parties shall be treated equally and have full opportunity to present their 
case (Article 18). Both parties will select procedural rules, seat of arbitration, 
language of proceedings upon agreement, otherwise the arbitral tribunal may 
determine for them. 
Based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, the LCA adopts nearly the same 
spirit of the Model Law through its provisions, with a few differences as 
indicated in its wording way. Specific contents of LCA shall be discussed later, 
but first we shall take a look at some significant similarities and differences 
between the LCA and Model Law. 
On the surface, the principle (i) of Model Law regarding the 
independence of arbitration agreement has been adopted by the LCA, via 
Article 16 and 19. In Vietnam laws, arbitration agreement also exists as a 
separate agreement with full valid, regardless of the contract. However, 
Vietnam laws request arbitration agreement to be in written forms (i.e. emails, 
fax, telegrams, etc.), unlike Model Law which allows for oral agreement as long 
as the content is recorded. The Model Law principle (ii) is also expressed by 
Article 6 of LCA, saying that the court is obliged to deny jurisdiction if an 
arbitration agreement already established between parties, unless the agreement 
is void. The principle (iii) of Model Law with respect to arbitration tribunal’s 
competence to rule on its jurisdiction also lies in the Article 43 of LCA. Finally, 
the principle (iv) of Model Law has been embodied to the LCA’s principle, at 
Article 4 regarding principles of dispute settlement by arbitration in Vietnam, 
providing that parties are given equal rights and obligations. 
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Moreover, there are some significant differences between the LCA and 
the Model Law. The table below sums up a few different regulations between 
LCA and the Model Law, followed by further detailed analysis of the LCA.  
 
Vietnam Law of Commercial 
Arbitration (LCA 2010) 
UNCITRAL Model Law 
2006 
Qualifications 
of arbitrators 
Set forth such qualifications to 
ensure that disputes are settled 
by reliable arbitrators (Article 
20).  
Not set forth the qualifications, 
only saying that if parties fail 
to determine the number of 
arbitrators, the number shall be 
three. 
Registration 
of an ad hoc 
arbitral award 
An award of ad-hoc arbitration 
is required to be registered at 
the court “in the locality where 
the arbitral tribunal issued 
such award prior to any 
request to the competent civil 
judgement enforcement 
agency to organize 
enforcement of the award” 
(Article 62). Registration or 
non-registration shall not 
affect the contents and validity 
of such award. 
Model Law does not provide 
for this issue. 
Grounds for 
setting aside 
an arbitral 
award 
“if the arbitral award is 
contrary to the fundamental 
principles of the law of 
Vietnam” (Article 68) 
“if the arbitral award is in 
conflict with the public policy 
of this State” (Article 34.2) 
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Unlike the Model Law whose principles are embodied through its text, 
the LCA of Vietnam has a specific Article 4 named “principles for dispute 
settlement by arbitration”: 
Vietnam LCA’s Principles of arbitration for dispute settlement 
Ø  “Arbitrators must respect the agreement of the parties if it does not breach 
prohibitions and is not contrary to social morals72.  
Ø Arbitrators must be independent, objective and impartial and must comply 
with the provisions of law.  
Ø Parties in dispute shall have equal rights and obligations. Arbitration 
tribunals shall be responsible to facilitate the parties to exercise their rights 
and to discharge their obligations.  
Ø Dispute resolution by arbitration shall be conducted in private, unless 
otherwise agreed by the parties.  
Ø An arbitral award shall be final.” 
While the obligation of arbitrators to respect the agreement of the parties 
(Article 4.1) expresses the principle of party autonomy, the ambiguity of what 
constitute a breach of prohibitions lead us to the ongoing debate about the 
definition of the rule of law in Vietnam. At the moment, Vietnam is aiming to 
develop into a socialist rule-of-law state – a concept that might be strange to 
democratic nations with trias politica. Thus, we can notice a shift in Vietnam 
legal texts’ regulation from stipulating what is ‘not prohibited’ to stipulating 
what is ‘allowed’. In other words, Vietnamese citizens now can do everything 
not prohibited by law. But this shift in regulating is in progress and Vietnam 
                                                
72 Social morals is an abstract concept in Vietnam. There is no legal document in Vietnam that defines 
the definition of social morality, so we can understand it as something that does not violate human 
ethics, does not go against the standards of society. There is only one small explanation of social 
ethics mentioned in Article 123 of the Civil code of Vietnam, providing that civil transactions which 
contravene social ethics shall be invalid, and social ethics are “common standards of conduct as 
between persons in social life, which are recognized and respected by the community”. Thus, social 
ethics, or social morals is an unwritten rule about what society considers acceptable. 
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specialized laws are not yet synchronized; not to mention the state agencies and 
their officials can do only what is allowed by law. The difference among laws 
remains as an issue for Vietnam legal framework at the current time. 
The LCA adopts the principle of due process in international law of 
dispute settlement: “parties in dispute shall have equal rights and obligations” 
(Article 4.3), as the same to the Model Law. This ensures both State or State-
owned enterprises and individuals, organization or private enterprises shall 
receive fair treatment through the judicial system, and that no party has priority 
beyond the other before the law.  
Next, the LCA stipulates that dispute resolution by arbitration shall be 
conducted in private unless otherwise agreed by the parties (Article 4.4). It 
mentions the private feature of arbitration but not yet the comprehensive 
confidentiality principle since there is no rules regarding the parties’ obligation 
to each other not to disclose information concerning the arbitration to the third 
parties and the arbitrators’ like obligations. Finally, an arbitral award shall be 
final (principle of finality) (Article 4.5).  
Jurisdiction of arbitration:  
For the first time since the Ordinance 2003, the use of arbitration in 
dispute settlement in Vietnam legal framework has been expanded by the LCA 
2010.  Pursuant to the Ordinance on Arbitration in 2003, disputes under the 
jurisdiction of arbitration shall be within the scope of “commercial activities”. 
As the interpretation of the term ‘commerce’ in the Ordinance is not unified 
throughout the implementation, the jurisdiction of arbitration is limited to listed 
activities in the Ordinance.73 Afterwards, the LCA does not name exhaustive 
                                                
73 Pursuant to Ordinance on Arbitration 2003, Article 2.3, “commercial activities” are one or more 
commercial activities of individuals, organizations, including sale and purchase of goods, providing 
services, distribution, representation, acting as agents, rent, leasing, leasing-purchase, consultancy, 
construction, engineering, licensing, investment, banking and finance, insurance, exploration and 
exploitation, transport of goods, passengers by airway, by sea, by railway, by road and other 
commercial activities in accordance with laws. 
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types of commercial activities. The jurisdiction of arbitration shall include 
disputes that arise from commercial activities or arising between parties at least 
one of whom is engaged in commercial activities74. The interpretation of 
‘commercial activities’ shall be referred to the domestic Commercial Law 2005 
which are “all activities of profit-making purposes, including, inter alia, sale 
and purchase of goods, service provider, investment and commercial 
promotion”75. The abolition of a listing method according to the Ordinance on 
Arbitration is to avoid misunderstanding that arbitration only has its jurisdiction 
with respect to listed commercial activities and to extend legal framework for 
activities of arbitration in Vietnam. The broad scope of commercial activity 
helps enlarge the use of arbitration agreement in business contracts. The LCA 
then is in conformity with other specialized laws while they also provide for 
concerned parties to choose arbitration as a mode of dispute resolution relating 
to the relating fields. For example, the Investment Law 2014 (Article 14), 
Construction Law 2014 (Article 146), Securities Law (Article 131), etc. During 
the arbitration proceedings, the arbitration tribunal has authority to verify facts, 
collect evidence and summon witness if necessary to resolve the dispute in 
impartial way. 
Qualifications of arbitrators:  
Regarding the compulsory requirements set in Article 20 of LCA, an 
arbitrator must have: (i) full civil legal capacity as prescribed in the Civil 
Code76; (ii) a university qualifications in law and at least five years working 
experience in conformity with education. In special circumstances, specialists 
with profound expertise, high qualifications and considerable practical 
                                                
74	Article 2, LCA 2010 
75 Article 3.1 of the Commercial Law 2005	
76 Vietnam legal system is inherited from the French civil law back in history. Vietnam Civil Code 
provides the legal status, legal standards for the conduct of natural and juridical persons; the rights 
and obligations of natural and juridical person regarding personal and property rights and obligations 
in civil relations (Article 1, Civil Code No. 91/2015/QH13) 
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experience may still be an arbitrator notwithstanding he/she does not have a 
bachelor degree. Moreover, any person who is currently a judge, prosecutor, 
investigator, enforcement officer or any official of a judgment enforcement 
agency is excluded from being an arbitrator. These compulsory requirements 
are not strict even though it serves as the minimum. An arbitration centre in 
Vietnam may stipulate higher qualifications as applicable to arbitrators in its 
own institution. 
Ethical standards of an arbitrator are addressed in the LCA. An arbitrator 
shall not be competent to resolve a dispute and be replaced in the following 
circumstances: “(a) The arbitrator is a relative or the representative of a party; 
(b) The arbitrator has an interest related to the dispute; (c) There are clear 
grounds for considering that the arbitrator is not impartial or objective; (d) The 
arbitrator was a mediator, representative or lawyer for either of the parties prior 
to the dispute being brought to arbitration for resolution, unless the parties 
provide written consent.”77 
 
Establishment of arbitration tribunal:  
The number of arbitrators in a tribunal is not limited but depends on the 
agreement of the parties. If the parties do not have any agreement on the 
number, the tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators.78  
Unless the arbitration centres provide their own procedural rules 
differently, the respondent shall have 30 days from the date of receipt of the 
claim and the request to select an arbitrator as sent from the arbitration centre, 
to make a selection of arbitrator for the respondent and then must notify the 
arbitration centre. The respondent can also instead request the chairman of the 
arbitration centre to appoint an arbitrator. Within 15 days after being selected, 
the arbitrators representing either party shall elect another third arbitrator to be a 
                                                
77 Article 42, LCA 2010 
78 Article 39, LCA 2010 
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chairman of the arbitration tribunal. If the respondent has failed to do all of the 
above, then within a further 7 days after expiry of the time-limit, the chairman 
of the arbitration centre shall automatically assign an arbitrator for the 
respondent as well as appoint the chairman of the tribunal. 
 
Defence 
A feature of Vietnam law of arbitration is that the burden of proof is on 
the respondent.   The respondent has the chance to ‘defence’ themselves prior to 
the hearings by sending a statement of defence to the arbitration centre within 
30 days from the date of receipt of the claim79. In the case of ad hoc arbitration, 
unless otherwise agreed the parties, the defence shall be sent to the claimant. 
The defence statement consists of supporting grounds and evidence to prove 
against the claim, or specified allegations in case the respondent finds that the 
dispute is outside the jurisdiction of arbitration, or the arbitration agreement is 
void or incapable of being performed. Besides defending himself, a respondent 
can make a counter claim against the claimant on issue relevant to the dispute. 
A statement of defence is a chance for the respondents to protect themselves 
and might save time going into hearings before it happens. If there is not 
defence submitted, the arbitration proceedings still continue. 
Enforcement of arbitral awards 
An arbitral award shall be final and shall be of full force and effect as 
from the date of its issuance, normally immediately be issued in the session or 
no later than 30 days from the end of the final session80. Firstly, the enforcement 
of the arbitral award depends on the willingness of the parties. Then if the 
award debtor does not voluntarily carry out the award or requests the award to 
be set aside, the award creditor can seek help from the competent civil judgment 
                                                
79 Article 35, LCA 2010 
80	Article 61, LCA 2010 
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enforcement agency to enforce such award81. Notably, despite the name of Law 
on Commercial Arbitration, the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
award is not governed by this but by the law on enforcement of civil 
judgement,82 which will be discussed subsequently.  
The award is final and there are no appeals hearing but the award can be 
set aside by the court under certain circumstances: 
Ø There was no arbitration agreement or the arbitration agreement is void83;  
Ø The composition of the arbitration tribunal was [or] the arbitration 
proceedings were, inconsistent with the agreement of the parties or 
contrary to the provisions of this Law.  
Ø The dispute was not within the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal; 
where an award contains an item, which falls outside the jurisdiction of 
the arbitration tribunal, such item shall be set aside.  
Ø The evidence supplied by the parties on which the arbitration tribunal 
relied to issue the award was forged; [or] an arbitrator received money, 
assets or some material benefit from one of the parties in dispute which 
affected the objectivity and impartiality or the arbitral award.  
Ø The arbitral award is contrary to the fundamental principles of the law of 
Vietnam84 
One of the grounds to challenge the arbitral award before the Vietnamese court 
is “violation of fundamental principles of Vietnamese laws” which is a 
deviation of the concept of “public policy” as provided in Article 34 (2) (b) (ii) 
of the Model Law.  
 
b. Civil Procedure Code of Vietnam and substantive laws 
As arbitration agreement is considered as a special “civil transaction”, it 
                                                
81 Article 65 and article 66, LCA 2010 
82 Article 67, LCA 2010 
83 See Article 18, LCA 2010	
84 Article 68, LCA 2010 
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is inevitable that the Civil Procedure Code85 (CPC) applies to govern certain 
aspects of arbitration agreement, especially its interpretation. In other words, the 
LCA stipulates the organization and operation of foreign arbitration in Vietnam 
but the procedures for recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral award are 
regulated under this Code, rather than in LCA since the award of foreign 
arbitrators, civil judgement or decisions of foreign courts belong to civil 
matters.  
According to Article 423, foreign arbitral award shall be recognized and 
enforced in Vietnam if the foreign country is a signatory to an international 
treaty about recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral award together with 
Vietnam (for example, the New York Convention 1958). In case the foreign 
country is not a signatory to such international treaty together with Vietnam, 
foreign arbitral award shall be recognized and enforced on the basis of principle 
of reciprocity. 
The competence to resolve the recognition of foreign arbitral awards 
belongs to the provincial court (Article 37, para1.b CPC 2015) and may choose 
one of three places: 1) Place of residence or work of the foreign award if the 
person against whom enforcement is sought is an individual; 2) where the party 
on whom the award is enforced is headquartered, if the person against whom 
enforcement is sought is the agency or organization; or 3) Place of property 
related to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (Article 39, para2.f CPC 
2015). 
 The award creditors have 3 years since the day the foreign arbitral award 
takes legal effect to submit their application to Vietnam’s Ministry of Justice 
(MOJ) or to a competent Vietnamese Court as specified in the Code, according 
to provisions of International treaty to which Vietnam is a signatory in order to 
                                                
85 The Civil Procedure Code No. 92/2015/QH13 (CPC 2015) is a Law passed by National Assembly 
of Vietnam, providing for the basic principles in civil proceedings; the order and procedures for 
settling civil cases and matters and enforcing civil judgements/ decisions of foreign Courts, award of 
foreign arbitrators. See Article 1, CPC 2015. 
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Step 2: Preparation 
for consideration of 
applications
request the Court to recognize and enforce such award (LCA Article 451). This 
timeline does not cover the duration of any force majeure event or objective 
obstacle resulting in the failure of the enforcer to file the application in time. 
The submitted application at a competent Vietnamese court to be considered 
does not mean that Vietnam’s court will conduct a re-trial over the dispute 
where the foreign arbitral award has been rendered. The court is only entitled to 
check and revise the foreign arbitral award and accompanying papers and 
documents with this Code’s provisions, other relevant domestic law provisions 
and International treaties to which Vietnam is a signatory to have a basis for the 
issuance of decision to recognize and enforce such award. 
The CPC ensures the right to appeal the Court decisions of involved 
parties. Both awards creditors and award debtors can challenge the decisions of 
the court regarding recognition and enforcement the foreign arbitral award. The 
time limit for making an appeal is 15 days from the date the court makes the 
decision. Once a party appeals the decision, the Collegial People’s Court of 
Vietnam must review the decision under the provisions of this Code (LCA 
Article 426). 
Figure 3.1 Procedures for recognizing foreign arbitral awards in Vietnam 
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After Vietnam’s Courts have made 
decisions on recognition and enforcement 
of foreign arbitral award, the award shall be legally effective like an effective 
decision of Vietnamese Court and enforced according to procedures for 
enforcement of a civil judgement (Article 427). Article 459 of the CPC provides 
the same exceptional circumstances for recognition of foreign arbitral award as 
in Article V of the New York Convention which will be discussed afterward. 
In short, the Supreme People’s Court is now under the process of 
reviewing and amending the CPC and in the latest draft of amendment, the 
provision on the burden of proof has been supplemented. Nevertheless, there is 
still no clear indication of which principles would be considered as 
“fundamental” and thus still be left as a huge gap in the arbitration law of 
Vietnam.  
Apart from the primary statutes LCA 2010 and CPC 2004, other laws and 
substantive laws that stipulate arbitration proceedings include: 
- The Law on Enforcement of Civil Judgments in 2008 (LECJ): detailed 
provision dealing with the enforcement of both domestic and recognised 
foreign arbitrations awards. 
- The Governmental Decree No. 63/2011/ND-CP on detailing and guiding 
certain articles of the LCA on arbitral institutions. 
Appeals 
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- The Resolution No.01/2014/ NQ-NDTP: After 4 years since the LCA came 
into effect, Vietnam Supreme People’s Court issued the Resolution 
No.01/2014 as a guiding document for the implementation of the LCA. 
Overall, the Resolution brings up more interpretations for the LCA. 
o provides interpretation on validity of arbitration agreement and 
grounds for setting aside arbitral award (Article 3,4,7)  
o provides strict and narrow interpretations of grounds for annulment of 
arbitral award (Article 14,15) 
o clarifies the supervisory and supporting role of domestic courts and  
o defines the supervisory and supportive role of national courts towards 
foreign arbitration seated in Vietnam (Article 2,5) 
o limits the vague “fundamental principles of Vietnamese laws” to 
“basic principles on conduct, whose effects are most overriding in 
respect of the development and implementation of Vietnamese law” or 
“interests of the government and the legitimate rights and interests of 
one or both parties or of third party”, and  
o Clarifies the procedures for ad hoc arbitration in Vietnam under the 
support of local courts; etc. 
2.       Treaties 
 
2.1   The New York Convention 1958 and Vietnam’s accession  
A fundamental feature of dispute settlement by arbitration is a respect to 
party autonomy accompanying the independence in choice making of the parties 
such as the choice of arbitrators and applicable laws. Moreover, arbitral award, 
after all, are not a judicial judgement that rendered by domestic court with a 
permanent judicial body to make sure the judgement is enforced or to apply 
sanctions otherwise. Especially with the element of ‘foreign’, it is inevitable 
that an award debtor wants to avoid his obligation or compensation to the award 
 57 
creditor due to a foreign arbitration other than a country where the award’s 
recognition and enforcement is sought. Therefore, arbitral awards are not 
always enforced by all parties, especially when parties are from countries that 
have not been a signatory of a multilateral or bilateral treaty on this matter. The 
New York Convention is established to serve for this purpose, which is 
improving such non-recognition and poor enforceability of foreign arbitral 
awards across borders. 
The New York Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards was adopted by the United Nations in 1958. Up till now, it is 
the most major multilateral international treaty provides for procedures for the 
recognition and enforcement foreign arbitral awards and also be a profound 
base for international arbitration system. There have been over 140 nations 
around the world adhered to and participated in the convention, including the 
United States, state members of the European Union, and other trading states 
from Latin American, African, Asian and Middle Eastern. 
 The Convention regulates contracting states to recognize foreign arbitral 
awards, i.e., arbitral awards made in the territory of another (Contracting) State 
as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of its 
territory (Article I and III). An award creditor who seeks enforcement of a 
foreign award must submit to the court the arbitral award and the arbitration 
agreement (Article IV). An award debtor can object to the enforcement by 
submitting proof as grounds for refusal of enforcement (Article V). The grounds 
for court’s refusal of recognition or enforcement of an award are: 
Ø The parties have no legal capacity to enter into an arbitration agreement 
according to the applicable law or the arbitration agreement is invalid 
under the referred law. 
Ø There is a breach of due process in which the party against whom the 
award is invoked is not properly notified of the appointment of 
arbitrator(s) or cannot present the case due to a certain reason. 
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Ø The award is rendered in respect of a dispute that is not anticipated in the 
terms of the submission to arbitration or goes beyond these terms; or the 
award covers those matters that are beyond the scope of the submission to 
arbitration. However, if it is possible to separate parts of the ruling that 
fall within the terms of reference from those that fall outside the terms of 
reference, these parts may be recognised and enforced. 
Ø The composition of the arbitral tribunal or in arbitral procedure is not in 
conformity with the agreement of the parties; 
Ø The award is not yet binding or suspended or set aside in the country of 
origin;  
Furthermore, the court may on its own motion refuse enforcement 
(Article V.2) if:  
Ø The court finds that the subject matter of the dispute cannot be settled by 
arbitration pursuant to the laws of that country; or 
Ø The court finds that the award is contrary to the public policy and the law 
of that country.  
In response to the needs to protect the legitimate rights and interests of 
both domestic and overseas investors and to improve the legal framework in 
Vietnam, the government of Vietnam has signed the accession to the 1958 New 
York Convention and became a signatory in 1995. Vietnam made three 
reservations under the Convention:  
- The scope of application of this Convention is to foreign arbitral awards 
that are made in the territory of another contracting state. In respect of 
foreign arbitral awards rendered in countries which are not a signatory or 
participant of the Convention, the convention may be applied on a 
reciprocity basis. 
- This Convention will only be applied to disputes arising out of 
commercial relations under Vietnamese law. 
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- All matters relating to the interpretation of the Convention should comply 
with the laws of Vietnam.  
Finally, the Convention not only focuses on the arbitral awards but also 
on the arbitration agreements themselves. It provides that a court of a 
Contracting State, when seized of a matter in respect of which the parties have 
made an arbitration agreement must, at the request of one of the parties, refer 
the parties to arbitration (the referral by a court to arbitration), unless the said 
agreement is invalid. 
Although the application of the New York Convention in Vietnam has on 
occasion been shadowed by controversial judicial decisions such as the courts’ 
decision to terminate arbitration proceedings or set aside arbitral awards based 
on unfounded grounds (which shall be discussed later on), the Convention still 
ensures the enforceability of foreign arbitral awards and arbitration agreements 
involving Vietnamese parties. 
 
 
2.2 Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 Regards international law, arbitration in Vietnam can also be moderated 
by international investment treaties. Vietnam is a party in 61 BITs and 23 TIPs, 
where almost all of them leave an option for settling investor-State disputes by 
arbitration. Generally, entering into BITs serves as a means of encouraging 
capital investments and investment protection by ensuring that foreign 
investors/ investments receive fair and equitable treatment as compared to 
domestic investors/ investments; giving full protection and security to foreign 
investments; guaranteeing that investments will not be expropriated by the 
government except for a public interest, and even only after adequate 
compensation; all meant to attract further investments. Engaging in international 
treaties leads to raise the awareness of arbitration in Vietnam, preparing for 
commercial disputes and treaty claims in the international arena. For instance, 
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Vietnam has promulgated a co-operational regulation (Decision 04/2014/QD-
TTg of the Prime Minister dated 14 January 2014) to deal with investment 
claims as preparation for possible treaty claims in the future. Large number of 
BITs provides for international arbitration as an instrument of dispute 
settlement. Depending on the bilateral investment treaty at issue, disputes can 
be submitted pursuant to the arbitration rules of ICSID, other institutional 
proceeding rules or the UNCITRAL rules. As long as the bilateral investment 
treaty is in place, the host state essentially consents to the jurisdiction of the 
arbitral body, and the investor is free to bring arbitration in any of the arbitral 
fora mentioned in the treaty.  
According to available statistics provided on the Investment Dispute 
Settlement Navigator86, there have been five ISDS cases in which Vietnam is a 
respondent and that stem out of BITs or Treaty with Investment provision. 
 
Table 3.1.: Cases under BITs 
Year of  
initiation 
Short 
case 
name 
Applicable 
IIA Summary 
Outcome of 
original 
proceedings 
2004 Trinh and 
Binh Chau 
v. Viet 
Nam  
Netherlands – 
Viet Nam BIT 
Claims arising out of the alleged 
unlawful confiscation of real estate 
and other claimants' assets without 
compensation, including the criminal 
conviction of Mr. Trinh. 
Settled 
2010 McKenzie 
v. Vietnam  
US – Viet Nam 
Trade 
Relations 
Agreement  
Claims arising out of the alleged 
Government's failure to transfer 
certain land rights to claimant's 
locally incorporated subsidiary 
necessary for the development of a 
tourism resort. 
Decided in 
favour of 
State 
2011 Dialasi v. 
Viet Nam  
France – Viet 
Nam BIT 
(1992)  
Claims arising out of the alleged 
Government's closure of a private 
nephrology and dialysis clinic in Viet 
Decided in 
favour of 
State 
                                                
86 UNCTAD, (n 12)  
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Year of  
initiation 
Short 
case 
name 
Applicable 
IIA Summary 
Outcome of 
original 
proceedings 
Nam operated by claimant's local 
subsidiary. 
2013 RECOFI 
v. Vietnam  
France – 
Vietnam BIT 
(1992)  
Claims to money for outstanding 
payments concerning RECOFI's 
participation in a State-run food 
assistance programme that provided 
food and basic commodities to Viet 
Nam when the country faced food 
shortages in 1987. 
Decided in 
favour of 
State 
2014 Trinh v. 
Vietnam  
Netherlands-
Vietnam BIT 
(1994)  
Claims arising out of the alleged 
breach of agreement on confidential 
terms between Vietnam government 
and the investor back in 2006 
Pending 
 (Source: UNCTAD database) 
Most recently, the case between Trinh Vinh Binh v. Vietnam government 
which initiated under the Netherlands– Vietnam BIT and conducted under the 
UNCITRAL Rules is drawing major public attention in Vietnam87.  
Trinh Vinh Binh is a Dutch – Vietnamese investor whose investment in 
Vietnam in the late 1980s was alleged to be illegal. Mr. Binh neither registered 
for enterprise establishment nor investment under the Law on Foreign 
Investment 1987 of Vietnam. He asked his family to use their names for 
ownership of the land, houses and a few Vietnamese businesses on paper. He 
also asked his relatives in Ba Ria-Vung Tau province to make more permanent 
residences for himself in those localities in order to receive as many land 
allocation from local authorities as possible. All these incidents are illegal under 
                                                
87 The following information of the case is sourced from Nghiencuuquocte.net 
http://nghiencuuquocte.org/2017/09/04/vu-kien-trinh-vinh-binh-vs-chinh-phu-viet-nam/  
Nghiencuuquocte.net is a non-political, non-profit project, firstly founded by PhD.Le Hong Hiep, 
New South Wales university. It is in form of law research blog, aimed at developing an international 
study resource in Vietnamese and promoting the study and research of international issues in 
Vietnam. 
 62 
Vietnam’s law. In 1996, the investor was arrested by the provincial authority for 
many criminal charges, including violations of regulations on land rights, tax 
evasion and bribery. He has been convicted of a criminal offense, sentenced to 
11 years in prison and all his property was confiscated after two trials. 
In 2000, the investor left Vietnam (reportedly fleeing Cambodia), 
returned to the Netherlands and in 2003 proceeded to sue the government of 
Vietnam, bringing the case to international arbitration ICSID as provided in 
Article 9.4 of the Treaty between Vietnam and Netherlands on Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (1994). His claim purportedly alleged 
that he suffered illegal detention, torture and abuse at the hands of state 
officials, as well as confiscation of assets amounting to more than $100 Million 
(US). Moreover, he claimed that the treatment of Vietnam to his investment 
breached the BIT between two nations. 
     An arbitration provision in investment treaty does help foreign investor 
like Trinh Vinh Binh stand a chance to secure his investment in lawsuit disputes 
with governments, regardless of the legality in his implementation of 
investment. Thanks to the arbitration, two parties met up and reached an 
agreement outside the court, thus the proceeding was terminated at request of 
parties in 2006. According to some sources, the content of the agreement might 
stipulate that Vietnamese government approves the exemption of serving Mr. 
Binh's imprisonment sentence, compensates the investor up to 100 million 
USD, returns the property to Mr. Binh, and permits him to return to Vietnam for 
further investment. In return, Mr. Binh withdrew all his suits and did not 
disclose any of the contents of this agreement. 
However, in 2015 Trinh Vinh Binh made a claim against Vietnam again, 
alleging that Vietnamese government failed to comply fully with the prior 2006 
agreement and claimed for 1.25 billion USD. So far there is no official 
announcement on Vietnam’s media or any arbitration institution statistics affirm 
the result of the arbitration and due to the nature of confidentiality of arbitration, 
 63 
details of arbitral proceedings are not disclosed to public.  
Based on the claims and developments of the case, we can see that the 
nature of commercial activity is highly complicated and so are its disputes. In 
both two times (2003 and 2015), Trinh Vinh Binh did not claim for assets return 
but for compensation (100 million USD and 1.25 billion USD), showing a wise 
move from the investor to dodge the issue of legal investment. Arbitration 
stemmed from BITs with retroactive provision like the Netherlands-Vietnam 
(1994) give the means foreign investor to protect their investment back in the 
day even before the BITs came into force. If the rendered arbitral award is in 
favour of investor, Vietnam government will lose not only large amount of 
money, but also more important the reputation with the international 
community. With the pressure from international public and increasing investor-
State disputes, Vietnam must step up its game in maintaining transparent 
business environment and confidence from foreign investors. The international 
treaties to which Vietnam is a contracting state shall play a critical part in both 
inspiring and forcing state and private entities of Vietnam to acclimatize to 
arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.  
3.       Practice 
When planning to invest abroad, the availability of an effective and 
transparent justice system is the main factor to increase confidence among 
investors and create an investment friendly environment, providing greater 
regulatory predictability and thereby contributing to sustainable growth. 
Although staying in line with the most fundamental principles concerning 
arbitration agreement, Vietnam arbitration does contain certain notable 
peculiarities.  
Arbitration has certain advantages and suitable for resolving commercial 
disputes because commercial activities are always urgent, flexible and quick, 
however, arbitration has not become a popular choice to Vietnamese investors. 
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The number of commercial disputes resolved by arbitration only accounts for 
1% compared to the number of commercial cases registered to the Supreme 
Court88. Vietnamese investors seem not to be aware of the full advantages of 
arbitration and they are used to going ahead with the traditional way of 
resolution: coming to the court.  
The revision report of a 4-year period of implementation the LCA from 
Vietnam’s Ministry of Justice shows that up to 2015, there are 12 arbitration 
centres in the country with total of 350 arbitrators. In 2017 that number has 
risen up to 18 arbitration centres and 471 arbitrators. Nevertheless, among those 
only the Vietnam International Arbitration Centre (VIAC) resolved for a large 
major of disputes. In 2016, VIAC receives 155 new registered cases, keeping 
the upward trend for recent 5 years89 (Figure 3.2.) The biggest portion of all 
disputes that are being settled at VIAC are related to sales contracts which 
accounts for 34%. The other fields are construction (15%), banking sector 
(11%) and insurance, tax, etc. (Figure 3.3) Based on the structure of 
administered disputes at VIAC, we can notice that arbitration is being 
considered and/or encouraged in various sectors of Vietnam’s economy and 
VIAC is a centre that receives and resolves diversified fields of commercial 
activities. Vietnamese government has issued further substantive laws guiding 
the implementation of the LCA. The year 2016 was also the first time for VIAC 
that the portion of domestic cases is over 50%, which further expresses the 
confidence of the Vietnamese community, especially the FDI sector, for 
commercial arbitration in VIAC.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
88 Ministry of Justice statistics updated to 2015. 
89 VIAC website statistics http://eng.viac.vn/  
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Figure 3.2 Number of disputes in VIA from 1993 to 2016  
       (Source: VIAC website) 
 
Figure 3.3 Types of disputes resolved at VIAC in 2016 
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       (Source: VIAC website) 
At the moment, VIAC is a leading international arbitration organization 
in Vietnam. It is the only Vietnamese arbitration institution which has being 
handled cases in diverse fields of commerce and also the only Vietnamese 
arbitration institution where arbitrating parties having diverse nationalities 
(Figure 3.4.). The number of disputes involving foreign elements continues to 
rise with the participation from parties from China, the United States, India, 
South Korea, etc. Various nationalities involving in the legal proceedings, along 
with foreign arbitrators from and outside VIAC arbitrators list altogether help 
confirms its position in Vietnam. This is a positive sign for Vietnam’s 
arbitration. 
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       (Source: VIAC) 
However, when being asked the reason why enterprise members of the 
EuroCham especially favour VIAC as a choice of arbitration, they reveal that it 
is more likely because other dispute settlement mechanisms in Vietnam, such as 
the Vietnamese courts, have a lot of disadvantages, rather than because of the 
effectiveness of VIAC arbitration itself. Therefore, the positive statistics 
reported from VIAC does not reflect thoroughly certain concerns about 
arbitration practice in Vietnam. 
First of all, Vietnamese courts are still not a favoured selection for 
foreign investors due to the perceived lack of independence of judiciary. 
According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report90, 
which assesses the competitiveness and drivers of productivity of 137 
economies over the world, Vietnam does not achieve high results in Institutions 
category. Overall, regards to institution, Vietnam ranks 79 out of 137 
participating countries in the latest report for period 2017-2018. The Institution 
                                                
90 World Economic Forum 2017-2018 (n 48) 
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category assesses the country on aspects of governmental regulation and 
legislation. Three noteworthy indexes that Vietnam ranks consistently low are 
the limited progress on judicial independence (84th); the efficiency of the legal 
framework in settling disputes (82nd) and the strength of investor protection 
(79st). The negative perception of Vietnamese judiciary is also expressed by the 
remarkably low grades in irregular payments and bribes (109th) and 
transparency of government policymaking (82nd) (Figure 3.6). The lack of 
transparency is for long criticized by foreign investors as judgements of the 
Vietnamese courts are generally not published or reported and, therefore, 
investors and their legal advisors do not have access to a body of precedents and 
case-law that could provide guidance and predictability on the likely outcome of 
individual disputes. Apart from problems of financing and tax, other major 
issues for doing business in Vietnam related to governmental offices and 
bureaucracy. The corruption and policy instability also affects investors’ 
business. (Figure 3.5). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Most problematic factors for doing business in Vietnam 
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(Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018) 
Figure 3.6 Global Competitiveness index of Vietnam in Institutions 2016 
 
 (Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2016) 
The recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards or foreign 
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court judgements cannot be done without the support and guidance from 
national court. Beside the main LCA governing arbitration in Vietnam with 
other guiding documents such as the Resolution 01 and Correspondence 
246/TANDTC-KT show active role of the national courts toward arbitral 
activities, especially the role of the Supreme People’s Court in the 
implementation of both arbitration-related legal documents. For example, the 
court can support the arbitration tribunal in summoning witnesses and collecting 
evidence (LCA Articles 46, 47, 48). However, how much influence the national 
court can make over foreign arbitration is open to debate. There are cases that 
Vietnamese court accepted an unfounded objection from the respondent to the 
jurisdiction of the VIAC, therefore overturned the VIAC’s jurisdiction to the 
dispute, leading to the dispute settlement proceedings terminated91. That is to 
say a respondent stands a chance to successfully having the court to dismiss an 
arbitration proceedings by applying an objection to tribunal’s jurisdiction. Since 
there is no right to appeal against the court’s decision, the arbitration 
proceedings can completely stop there. Another example of Vietnamese court’s 
overwhelming intervention to VIAC proceedings is when a court set aside the 
VIAC’s award on the grounds that the arbitration was proceeded in Vietnamese 
instead of in English as in the arbitration agreement. The award was set aside 
although the claimant did provide sufficient evidence about the other party’s 
consensus of choosing Vietnamese to arbitrate, and language of the hearing was 
not a critical factor to the reasoning of the tribunal and validity of the award92. 
Another reason that Vietnamese courts could base on to set aside arbitral awards 
is ‘contrary to fundamental principles of Vietnamese law', which is obviously a 
vague concept and will be discussed later on.   
Examples such as the ones mentioned above tell the story about 
Vietnamese courts’ strong interference in arbitration process which leads to a 
                                                
91	Eurocham, Trade and Investment Issues and recommendations: Whitebook 2017 
92 EuroCham, Trade and Investment Issues and recommendations: Whitebook 2016, 
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result that the arbitration proceedings could not take place or the issued award 
could not be enforced. Currently, some certain progress has been made. In 
VIAC particularly, during 2015 there were 13 requests to challenge VIAC 
awards and not one has succeeded. For 2016 (three first quarters of 2016), two 
requests to set aside a VIAC awards on competence have succeeded before 
Vietnamese courts.93 No further information is available. Among other efforts, 
Resolution 01 which was issued 4 years after the LCA stresses that the courts 
shall not reconsider the merits of the dispute to set aside the final arbitral award 
but may only determine if there is a valid ground to set aside or not as provided 
in the LCA. 
The role of national courts is truly prominent in judicial system. Without 
courts’ recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, the parties whom the 
award is enforced on hardly comply with the tribunal decisions. However, it is 
time for Vietnam judicial system to separate clearer the competency of the court 
to avoid abuse of authority, and to move towards pro-arbitration with minimum 
court’ intervention.  For now, we believe that pressure from foreign business 
communities and government’s efforts to improve the investment environment 
of Vietnam during the negotiation of free trade agreements may also be 
additional driving forces for positive changes in the near future.  
 
 
Part 4. Assessment the compatibility of EVFTA investment court 
with Vietnam domestic laws  
The Sub-section 3, Section 3 (Resolution of Investment disputes) in 
Chapter 8 are in fact just one of Vietnam’s commitments on investment in 
EVFTA. Beside ISDS mechanism, other categories of commitments on 
investment include: investment liberalization principles; investment protection 
principles; and schedule of market access commitments. The EU, as a top 
                                                
93 VIAC (n 89); and Eurocham 2017(n 91)	
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foreign investor in the world, surely wants to set up demanding protection for 
their investors in Vietnam via a new-generation FTA like the EVFTA which is 
considered to be higher than levels under the WTO. The WTO Dispute 
settlement mechanism is a system to resolve dispute between two states which 
means an individual investor cannot submit a direct claim against a State to the 
tribunal system. In 2015, EU’s outward FDI to Vietnam was 0.7 billion€ FDI 
flows and 5.7 billion€ 94 of FDI stocks, making EU one of the largest investors 
in Vietnam. In return, Vietnam’s FDI to EU is much less, with only 0.2 billion€ 
of FDI stocks, showing that Vietnam investment is not well-equipped to access 
this large market. Thus, Vietnam certainly desires to attract more investment 
from this key investor initially and maintain a certain investment environment 
for its domestic investors as well. With such wide coverage and high 
commitments levels on investment, especially with the newly introduced ICS as 
replaced traditional ISDS arbitration platform, it is inevitable that Vietnam’s 
legal framework and investment activities between the two Parties are going to 
have a significant impact in the upcoming time. Therefore, with respect to 
EVFTA commitments on investment and altogether putting under a new 
investment dispute settlement mechanism, Vietnam seriously need to adjust its 
legal framework in order to conform and enforce its obligations. This part of the 
paper will serve the purpose of reviewing Vietnam’s current legal framework in 
the light of the specific commitments to the new ISDS system under the 
EVFTA that the group of author believe to be a necessary step at this period. 
We are sure that up to this moment, this kind of review is already carried out by 
responsible government authorities such as Ministry of Investment and Planning 
(MIP) or Ministry of Justice (MOJ), as a part of Vietnam’s process of 
negotiation and preparation prior the Agreement coming into force. We are 
aware that the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) had 
                                                
94 Statistics from European Commission website with date of retrieval: 15/02/2017 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/vietnam/  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_111584.pdf   
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conducted a report “Review Vietnam’s legal framework against commitments 
under the EVFTA on investment”95. Nevertheless, this public report is yet 
subjective and sketchy since it delivers perspective of domestic firms solely. 
This paper is expected to bring a perspective that is more balanced between 
Vietnam’s and the EU’s point of view – the two parties of the Agreement.  
Given the coverage of this review including:  
(i) Vietnam’s commitments to the regulations of ICS in the EVFTA: 
mainly focused on Sub-Section 3, Section 3 Resolution of 
Investment Disputes, Chapter 8 Investment of the EVFTA.  
(ii) Vietnam’s legal framework of recognition and enforcement foreign 
arbitral awards,  
we hope to give detailed comparisons between Vietnamese legislation and 
practice on the issue versus particular obligations about ICS, assessing the 
situation and to see if Vietnam’s legal framework is compatible with EVFTA 
regulations on ICS or not, thereby contributing suitable proposals of adjusting 
the legal system in conformity with the ICS in the next part of this paper. To 
analyse the compatibility between Vietnam legal framework of arbitration and 
the ICS under EVFTA, the relevant articles shall be categorized as follows. 
 
 Scope and definition: Article 1 (Scope), Article 2 (Definitions) 
On the surface, we can see that since the ICS is now introduced to 
Vietnam for the first time; there is no system of standing arbitration court for 
investor-State disputes in Vietnam, particularly between EU investors and 
Vietnam government. Thus, there is no domestic regulations in Vietnam law 
regulate such standing body, and there are no codification of scope (Article 1) 
of the ICS mechanism between EU and Vietnam and of all definitions of terms 
                                                
95	Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), July 2016, Report Review Vietnam’s legal 
framework against commitments under the EVFTA on investment:  
http://wtocenter.vn/publication/reviewing-vietnamese-laws-and-regulations-against-evfta-
commitments-investment		
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(Article 2) in the agreement existed in Vietnam laws which are relevant to 
define the coverage of disputes which are applicable for ICS, as well as the 
definitions of subjects whose right to proceed in accordance with that coverage 
are very essential (like the definitions of investor and investment?). These 
articles needed to be included in Vietnam legal system for instance in form of a 
part of a suggested Law that guides the implementation of the Agreement. 
Vietnam has the Law on Conclusion, Accession and Implementation of 
Treaties (Law No.41/2005/QH11) or known as the Treaty Law 2005 which 
contains detailed provisions on implementation of treaties in Vietnam. 
According to the Treaty Law 2005, treaties may be applied directly as long as 
they ‘explicit and specific enough for implementation’ or Vietnam government 
may ‘decide or propose to amend, supplement, cancel or promulgate legal 
documents for the implementation of the treaty’96. In other words, treaties that 
are not clear enough for direct implementation would be incorporated into the 
domestic systems via specific legislation97. In the case of EU-Vietnam Free 
Trade Agreement, the section of ICS is clear enough to apply directly; however, 
it is ideal to have further guidance from the government about implementation 
of the agreement. 
 Submission of a claim and conditions precedent: Article 7 (Submission 
of a claim); Article 8 (Other claims); Article 9 (Procedural and Other 
Requirements for the Submission of a Claim); Article 10 (Consent); 
Article 11 (Third Party Funding) 
                                                
96 Article 6.3, the Law on Conclusion, Accession and Implementation of Treaties (Law 
No.41/2005/QH11) 
http://moj.gov.vn/vbpq/en/lists/vn%20bn%20php%20lut/view_detail.aspx?itemid=5509  
97	Lan Ah Nguyen, Hao Duy Phan and Jessye Freeman, International and ASEAN Law in the ASEAN 
10 National Jurisdictions: The Reception of International Law in the Legal System of Vietnam, Centre 
for International Law (CIL) Working Paper. 
 https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/SD_ES-ASEAN-10-Vietnam-study.pdf   
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Article 7 and Article 9 in Sub-Section 3 gives guidance on the procedure 
to submit a claim. At first, alternative dispute resolutions (ADR) are always 
encouraged. If ADR such as mediation and consultation do not settle the 
dispute, the claimant may notify the Party of its intent to bring a claim98 (within 
6 months since submission of request for consultations – this period is also a 
prerequisite for claim submissions). Initially the claimant shall deliver a notice 
of intent, sent to the EU or to Vietnam as the case may be. After three months 
since the notice of intent, the claimant submits the claim to the Tribunal under 
one of a number of sets of arbitration rules: ICSID Rules, ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules, and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In this context, for 
European investors in Vietnam and for Vietnamese investors in Europe, the 
ICSID Rules are not available as neither Vietnam nor the EU is a member of 
ICSID Convention, so the UNCITRAL Rules or ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules can be used. This is also a considerable point in Vietnam’s current legal 
framework regards to the implementation of its commitments to any type of IIA 
with other countries as well. In the near future, Vietnam should consider 
pursuing ICSID Membership, given the popularity of the ICSID Rules and the 
long-established of the ICSID. The ICSID and ad hoc arbitration under 
UNCITRAL rules have always been the most frequently proposed fora in 
BITs99. 
 
Furthermore, the consent of EVFTA Parties in Article 10 is explicit and 
confirms the commitments of compliance from Vietnam.100 If this protocol of 
submission starts coming into use, Vietnam needs a clear system to manage and 
                                                
98 Article 6, Sub-Section 3, EVFTA 
99 OECD, Dispute settlement provisiosn in international investment agreements: A large sample 
survey, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Investment Division, Directorate 
for Financial and Enterprise Affairs. 
 http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291678.pdf  
100 Notably, Vietnam has five years after the entry into force to ensure the ICSID-equivalent 
enforcement regime. During the transitional 5-year period, Viet Nam does have an international 
obligation to enforce arbitral awards by virtue of the New York Convention (Article 10). 
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oversee the compliance of all claims brought against Vietnam, which is what 
Vietnam currently lacks. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment of Vietnam (MPI) are the two most competent and 
relevant authorities in this issue. At the moment, there is yet faint cooperation 
between these two governmental bodies – judicial and executive – in oversee 
the claims of ISDS cases. At the same time, there has not been any 
governmental gate information to provide information and records of claims and 
disputes to public. Finally, Article 8 basically helps to prevent that a single 
claim is being addressed by multiple courts. To comply to this procedure, in the 
future the MPI is supposed to support the MOJ in keeping track of the claims 
and checking its compliance.  
Another important part in dispute settlement process is finance, and third-
party funding is becoming an integral part of arbitration in modern time. For 
many reasons disputing parties, especially claimants, wish to gain financial 
support for their arbitration process; they may want to minimize the risk, to 
reduce legal budgets, or to take the cost to pursue litigation off-record. The third 
party must be a natural or judicial person who is not a party to the dispute. This 
third party may make an agreement with a disputing party to finance wholly or 
partly cost of the proceedings, and in return they expect to get ‘a remuneration 
dependent on the outcome of the dispute or in the form of a donation or 
grant’101. From this definition of ‘third party funding’ we can anticipate that 
main users of third party funding are claimants, funders, funding brokers, or law 
firms. Article 11 of the ICS allows disputing party to get third-party funding, 
but emphasizes that the funding must be informed timely to the other Party and 
the Tribunal. Vietnam government and Vietnamese investors just need to pay 
attention to this rule of time, and take full advantage of a possibility of financial 
help in their dispute settlement process. However, we think that an important 
point which is not mentioned in the Article 2 Definition of Third-Party Funding 
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is about the control and conflicts of interests of the third-party funder. It is 
impossible that a funder might want to control an arbitration to some extent 
(such as time, seat of arbitration, etc.) via his financial influence. However, as 
this is a permanent standing court, this possibility should not be a worry. On the 
other hand, a chance of hidden conflicts of interests can exist, which leads to the 
fact that the claimant is encouraged and backed-up to submit a lot of frivolous 
claims. In the future, Vietnam’s Government, along with the MOJ and MPI, 
should consider making investigation on the profile of third-party funder of EU 
investors if necessary. 
 
  
 Investment Tribunal System: Article 12 (Tribunal); Article 13 
(Appeal Tribunal); Article 14 (Ethics)  
 In this subsection, significant features about the operation of 
investment tribunal system are provided. Overall, this system of investment 
dispute resolution is novel for Vietnam. There is a standing panel for each 
instance, the disputing parties’ choice of decision maker is replaced with an 
administrative assignment of panel members, and especially the availability of a 
second (appellate) instance to review the legal analysis of a final Tribunal 
report. Looking at Vietnam legal framework, current practices shall definitely 
fall short of EVFTA commitments to this new ISDS mechanism unless Vietnam 
has set certain rules as guidance for implementation. The ICS in EVFTA is not 
yet recognized in Vietnam domestic law. Even though according to VCCI’s 
report, this parallel existence does not affect domestic legal system, it is a very 
subjective opinion102. The fact that the ICS in EVFTA does not exist 
substituting to, but simultaneously with domestic dispute settlement resolution 
is very challenging for Vietnam once the system goes into force. So far, all 
arbitral awards shall have to be reviewed again by the domestic court in order to 
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be recognized and enforced. Here the ICS is an external standing body, outside 
domestic legal system, whose decisions shall not be reviewed by domestic 
courts and enforced as if it is a judgement of domestic courts (after first five-
year duration since entry applying the NYC). Thus, we are indeed looking 
forward to seeing how reality is in the future when the ICS comes into use. 
Article 12 and Article 13 descriptively instruct the organizational 
structure of two panels: The Tribunal and the Appeal Tribunal. In short, Parties 
choose in total 15 members: 9 Tribunal members and 6 Appeal Tribunal 
members. Each must select 5 nationals (3 for the Tribunal, 2 for the Appeals 
Tribunal) and together select 5 non-Party-nationals for the two tribunals. The 
national tribunal member positions are not limited to nationals. All selected 
Members be on either of the panels must be competent in terms of legal merits 
and conform to the ethical requirements as set out in Article 14. As stated in part 
two of this paper, there are three points of requirements of composition of the 
courts that Vietnam should be concerned about. First, Judges of the ICS must 
have demonstrated expertise in public international law in order to become 
eligible. The Agreement does not introduce any criteria to measure and assess 
such expertise demonstration for judges, whether it is their educational major, 
their research field, or experiences of involving ISDS cases. Second, there are 
differences across nations regarding the qualifications for judicial offices. 
Although the list is nominated by Vietnam, both Parties of the agreement should 
reach consensus on common qualifications for judicial offices to be nominated 
to member of the Tribunal system in order to facilitate the appointment process 
of the Trade Committee afterwards and to have a rather even panel of judges. 
Finally, the impartiality, fairness and diligence of the judges, as similar to 
standards of conduct in traditional ISDS mechanism, are once again reaffirmed 
under EVFTA in the form of a Code of Conduct (Annex…), binding upon the 
Court. Once appointed into Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal panels, they shall 
stop any other business, in which their roles are counsels, experts or witnesses, 
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that related to either party’s new or pending investment disputes under this or 
any other agreement or domestic law. Vietnam must be extremely cautious to 
these comprehensive rules and selection criteria of the judges since they deprive 
parties of the power of influencing the selection of the judges seating on the 
Court and tackle the “double hat” issue. Judges must fully aware of their roles 
and responsibilities to represent the rights of their country in this critical 
arbitration system. 
Furthermore, both Tribunal and Appeal Tribunal will draw up their own 
Working Procedures and adopt it for implementation. While either tribunal 
could rely on arbitration rules chosen by the investor, the fact that the Appeal 
Tribunal is the first such institution means that there are no pre-existing rules on 
which it could rely.103  
From the start, we can see that the role of MOJ is extremely 
indispensable and so is the MPI’s. Regarding the selection of Vietnam’s 
proposals to the Trade Committee the composition of Tribunal systems, the 
MOJ can check the legal qualifications of nominees as they are knowledgeable 
about qualifications required in Vietnam for appointment to judicial office or 
“be jurist of recognized competence”. On the other hand, MPI can contribute to 
the judge selection process since the agency can provide experts in the field and 
they need to cooperate with the MOJ to provide sufficient resources for 
conducting the search for optimal candidates. As the value of efficiency in 
dispute resolution is highly valued, investors who are familiar with the specifics 
of investment arbitration can also support the system.  
 
 Applicable law, interpretation and languages: Article 16 (Applicable 
law and rules of Interpretation), Article 24 (Language of the 
proceedings) 
                                                
103 VCCI (n 95)  
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According to Article 16, when rendering a decision, the Tribunals are to 
apply provisions of the EVFTA along with other general principles of 
international law applicable between Vietnam and the EU. In terms of 
interpretation, the Tribunal shall apply customary rules of treaty interpretation 
of public international law, as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. If relevant, the tribunal may take the domestic law into consideration 
and to interpret the domestic law, the Tribunal shall only be bound by the 
interpretation given by the domestic courts. Therefore, for Vietnam, the MOJ 
will be responsible for providing the tribunal with precise interpretations of 
domestic provisions given from Vietnamese courts. Vietnamese government 
must regulate and assign clearly which courts in the judicial system are 
competent to interpret Vietnamese law. Vietnam’s judicial system comprises of 
the People’s courts system, military tribunals system, and people’s 
procuracies.104 In respect of processing investment disputes, People’s courts 
system is the most suitable for the task.  But in the People’s courts system there 
are four levels: The Supreme People’s Court, the superior people’s courts, the 
provincial-level people’s courts and district-level people’s courts. But which 
interpretation should be considered? Should be the interpretation of laws by 
highest court – the Supreme People’s Court? Or should it be the provincial-level 
courts where the investment agreement was signed, where the representative 
company of the European investor is based (if any), or where the properties/ 
investment of the EU investor is held? Many factors must be considered in 
interpretation domestic law. Not to mention Vietnamese legal framework is in 
need of urgently comprehensive consolidation.  
About language of the proceedings, there is no pre-determined official 
language of proceedings, as this is to be determined by agreement of the 
disputing parties or, if they cannot agree, by the Tribunal (Article 24). If the 
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latter, the MOJ must be in charge of negotiation with the claimant about 
language as they lead the dispute settlement process. It is important to 
remember that if language of proceedings is unanimously agreed on and 
whichever the language is, Vietnamese courts must have no intervention on the 
recognition and enforcement of the arbitral award rendered by the Tribunal. 
Setting aside a foreign arbitral award on fraudulent ground which is the 
language of proceedings was inconsistent to what the arbitration agreement 
between the parties provided for did happen in Vietnam,105 not to mention that 
the language of hearings was immaterial and not decisive factor to the reasoning 
and validity of the award. This negative record of Vietnam’s weak compliance 
with foreign arbitral award protocol must not be repeated. 
 
 Claims management of ICS: Article 33 (Consolidation), Article 17 
(Anti-circumvention), Article 18 (Preliminary objections), Article 19 
(Claims unfounded as a matter of law) 
Basically, the provisions in Article 33 (Consolidation) permits the 
President of the Tribunal to combine separate claims into a single Tribunal 
process. In the event that two or more claims submitted arise out of the same 
events and bear in common a question of law or fact, the respondent may seek 
for consolidation of such claims by submitting to the President of the Tribunal a 
request for consolidation and sending the request to each claimant in a claim 
which the respondent seeks to consolidate. Considering the efficiency and the 
interest of consistency of awards, the President of the Tribunal shall constitute a 
new division of the Tribunal who have jurisdiction over all or part of the claims 
which are subject to the joint consolidation request. This provision is critical 
under a circumstance when Vietnamese government as respondent is facing a 
number of claims from EU investors at the same time and arising out of the 
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same event. By consolidating such claims, government can save time and costs 
handling each claim one by one. Nevertheless, this demands the MOJ of 
Vietnam to be substantially efficient in managing claims from EU claimants in 
order to submit the request of consolidation in time, with detailed evidences to 
prove the grounds and scope of consolidation request. 
Other provisions in Sub-Section 5 indicates the efficiency of claims 
management is about Anti-circumvention (Article 17); Preliminary objections 
(Article 18) and Claims unfounded as a matter of law (Article 19). Pursuant to 
Article 17, The Tribunal shall examine the dispute to check whether the dispute 
was foreseeable with high degree of probability at the time when the claimant 
acquired ownership of investment. Upon the basis of facts, if the investment 
was found out to be acquired for the main purpose of submitting the claim 
against the host country, despite the predictable loss, the Tribunal shall 
determine to decline jurisdiction. 
The respondent is given a chance to file an objection against a claim 
which is clearly lacking in legal merit, no later than 30 days after the 
constitution of the division of Tribunal and in any event before the first session 
of the division of the Tribunal. The respondent may present arguments to the 
tribunal to this effect for early decision. Without prejudice to a Tribunal's 
authority to address other objections as a preliminary question, the respondent 
may also present arguments to the tribunal for early decision if a claim fails to 
present a prima facie case. In other words, a claim, or any part thereof, is not a 
claim for which an award in favour of the claimant may be made even if the 
facts alleged were assumed to be true, the Tribunal shall decide that claim is 
unfounded as a matter of law (Article 19). 
In order to comply with this group of provisions, Vietnamese government 
needs to provide the Tribunal with the necessary arguments and evidence 
timely. Being able to seek for early decisions can help a Party save lots of time 
and cost in litigation. To do that, the infrastructure and resources for close 
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cooperation between the MPI, the MOJ and provincial authorities such as 
Department of Planning and Investment (DPI) at Hanoi city, Ho Chi Minh city, 
Da Nang city, etc. need to be securely synchronized so that the relevant 
information is provided to MOJ in a timely manner. We are not aware of such 
coordination happened in previous ISDS cases of Vietnam, as information 
related to Vietnam’s ISDS cases from governmental agencies is normally being 
kept confidential. Local authority will be the helpful force investigating the 
investment practice which dispute arose out of, providing facts for MOJ to 
analyse if whether a claim is manifestly without legal merits or unfounded. 
 
 Transparency of proceedings: Article 20 
The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration will apply to the ICS between Vietnam and the EU. This requires 
the publication of submissions and rulings, inter alia, of the disputes such as: the 
request for consultations (Article Consultations), the notice of intent (Article), 
the notice of challenge and the decision on this challenge (Article Ethics), the 
request for consolidation (Article). All these documents as regulated under 
Article 3 of UNCITRAL Transparency Rules shall be made publicly available. 
A noteworthy point is that UNCITRAL Transparency Rules provides for 
exceptions to transparency in its Article 7 which are confidential or protected 
information shall not be made available to the public. Once the ICS comes into 
force, the rules of transparency must be complied to. This provision is quite a 
challenge for Vietnam as the country never ranks high in transparency in 
judicial decision making and lawsuit documents publication. It is common in 
Vietnam that arbitration proceedings usually take place behind closed doors. At 
the moment, a public database of the MOJ about claims and arbitration 
involving foreign investors does not exist. Information that is available to public 
about ISDS cases between Vietnamese government and foreign investors such 
as the abovementioned Trinh Vinh Binh case is only via law blogs of legal 
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community. With the tradition of secrecy and not-open-to public trials, Vietnam 
must adjust its practice to comply to ICS commitments in transparency. On the 
other hand, the MOJ must prepare to be ready to provide any sufficient evidence 
and legal basis to request for redaction of confidential information since there 
could be classified government information embraced in the dispute and the 
government has proper right to reserve it. Furthermore, both MPI and MOJ 
would benefit from accession to the most current materials in this area. This is 
also related to Article 21 (Interim decisions). The MOJ shall lead the dispute 
settlement process and will provide the Tribunal with the essential arguments/ 
evidence about what the preservation orders are needed.  
 
 
 Roles of involved parties: Article 25 (The non-disputing party); Article 
26 (Expert reports); Article 32 (Roles of other parties) 
 
Even though the definition of "non-disputing Party" is explained in 
Article 2 (Definition) 106, Section 3 Resolution of Investment Dispute, the role 
of non-disputing Party seems to be still unclear for both parties of the 
agreement. The Non-Disputing Party has the right to be notified of the dispute, 
including receiving from the respondent following documents: a request for 
consultations, a notice of intent, notice of determination and a claim (Article 
25.1 para. a) and any documents upon request in accordance with the rules on 
transparency. It also has the right to attend a hearing and to make oral 
statements regarding interpretation of the Treaty provisions.  
However, as the nature of the proceedings is a dispute settlement, the role 
of making interpretive statements about the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement 
at hearings is yet vague. Perhaps the interpretation of domestic laws is rather 
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material. Another concern about non-disputing parties making treaty 
interpretation is the non-disputing party may show prejudice to a disputing party 
who is its nationals107 by making broad and out of scope treaty interpretation, 
which could be considered a manner ‘tantamount’ to diplomatic protection. 
However, before this provision of the EVFTA, Vietnam needs to determine 
which ministry to act in the role of “non-disputing party” and allocate its 
competencies promptly.  
Last but not least, the role of experts is welcomed to the dispute 
settlement by the Tribunal since the Tribunal may need advice from experts on 
factual issue concerning environmental, health, safety or other matters raised by 
a disputing party in a proceeding (Article 26). However, Vietnam government 
should bear in mind that requested report from experts would definitely add 
more cost to the proceedings108 and require sufficient budget for this stage.   
There is also a provision included to regulate the role of each Party to the 
Agreement. Accordingly, no home State shall give diplomatic protection to its 
investor, or bring an international claim as diplomatic assistance for its investor, 
in respect of a submitted claim unless the other Party has failed to abide by and 
comply with the award rendered in such dispute (Article 32). However, informal 
diplomatic exchanges for the sole purpose of facilitating a settlement of the 
dispute is acceptable. On other hand, either Vietnam or the EU as a party of this 
agreement can make a claim of a state-to-state dispute settlement under Chapter 
X regarding the other Party’s measure that is alleged to have breached the 
                                                
107 Paparinskis, M., & Howley, J. (2015). Article 5. Submission by a non-disputing Party to the treaty. 
In M. Wong & R. Hadgett (Authors) & D. Euler, M. Gehring, & M. Scherer (Eds.), Transparency in 
International Investment Arbitration: A Guide to the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-
Based Investor-State Arbitration (pp. 196-226). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
108 For greater certainty, the term “costs of proceedings” includes (a) the reasonable costs of expert 
advice and of other assistance required by the Tribunal, and (b) the reasonable travel and other 
expenses of witnesses to the extent such expenses are approved by the Tribunal.  
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Agreement. The MOJ should appoint a responsible ministry, the MOIT for 
example, to be in charge of investment dispute settlement under the Chapter X 
in the EVFTA. 
 
 Awards and enforcement of arbitral awards: Article 27 (Provisional 
Award); Article 28 (Appeal procedure); Article 29 (Final award); 
Article 31 (Enforcement of award) 
The framework of Tribunal decisions is clearly set out via Article 27, 
Article 28, Article 29 and Article 31. Within 18 months of the date of 
submission of the claim, disputing parties shall receive a provisional award 
issued by the Tribunal (Article 27). The award must not include punitive 
damages but strictly of monetary damages, not exceeding the amount of loss 
suffered and applicable interest. A noteworthy point in the provision is that all 
costs of proceedings shall be borne by the unsuccessful disputing party unless 
the Tribunal decides otherwise and adjust proportionately. However, the 
exceptional circumstances are not defined, only saying that if the Tribunal finds 
that apportionment is appropriate and decides case-by-case. Vietnam 
government must consider all costs incurred in proceedings, including costs of 
experts report as mentioned above, costs of legal representation and assistance, 
etc. in order to provide argument to the Tribunal for burden of costs reduction if 
possible. At the same time, it is advisable for Vietnam to have a calculation and 
estimation for the maximum amount of costs to contribute to the supplemental 
rules on fees which shall be adopted by the Trade Committee within a year after 
the entry into force of this Agreement (Article 27.5).  
Disputing parties can appeal the provisional award to the Appeal Tribunal 
within 90 days for a review of the legal analysis. Otherwise, the provisional 
award shall become a final one (Article 28, Article 29). The appellant is 
required to provide security, including the costs of appeal as well as other 
reasonable amount determined by the Appeal Tribunal. Other provisions which 
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related to proceedings including Article 11, Article 20, 21, 23 shall be applied 
mutatis mutandis in respect of the appeal procedure. The standing panel of 
Appellate Tribunal for ISDS arbitration is brand new for Vietnam so it is 
difficult to say beforehand if Vietnam legal framework is compatible with the 
new system, but we know for sure that Vietnam needs to revise the advisability 
of an appeal and develop its technical assistance. A tight cooperation and 
consultation between MOJ and MPI is necessary. 
Under the EVFTA, the final arbitral award rendered from the Tribunal or 
the Appellate Tribunal is binding to each Party and each Party must recognize 
and enforce it in its territory as if it were a final judgment of its own courts 
(Article 31). In fact, this provision is in addition to Article 10 (Consent), by 
which Parties gives consent to dispute resolution proceedings and legally accept 
the [Appeals] tribunal’s decision.109 Vietnam will have a period of five years 
after the entry into force of this Agreement to prepare for compliance fully to 
Article 31. During this time of transition, the recognition and enforcement of the 
tribunal’s awards in Vietnam shall be governed by the New York Convention 
(NYC), as well as the LCA, the Resolution 01 and courts of Vietnam. There are, 
however, a number of legislative changes that will also have to be pursued to 
bring Vietnamese law into conformity with the obligation of enforcement. 
 Perhaps this Article 31 about enforcement of awards is the one that poses 
most concerns among all the clauses about the ICS and plays a weighty role in 
implementation the agreement between the two parties. Nevertheless, member 
companies of EuroCham (European Chamber of Commerce in Vietnam) have 
indicated their concerns about difficulties in achieving the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitration awards by Vietnamese courts.110 In Vietnam, the 
                                                
109 ‘consent’ “implies […] the disputing parties shall refrain from seeking to appeal, review, set aside, 
annul, revise or initiate any other similar procedure before an international or domestic court or 
tribunal, as regards an award pursuant to this Section” (Article 10, Section 3, EVFTA) 
110 VCCI Whitebook 2016 (n 92), VCCI Whitebook 2017 (n 91) 
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LCA 2010 of Vietnam provides that Vietnamese courts can reject the 
application of a foreign arbitral award if the award violates fundamental 
principles of Vietnamese law (Article 68, LCA 2010) but there is no current 
legal text in Vietnam legal system regulates what “fundamental principles of 
Vietnamese laws” are.  
Later on, the Resolution 01/2014/NQ-HDTP offers a bit more 
interpretation for the LCA’s clause that “the arbitral award contravenes the 
basic principles of Vietnam's Law” means the arbitral award violates “the 
effective basic rules for formulation and implementation of Vietnam’s Law” 
(Article 14, d) but this interpretation is rather inadequate. While Vietnam 
chooses the alternative of “fundamental principle of law”, the Model Law and 
the New York Convention had different approach with the term of “public 
policy”111. To assess whether an arbitral award is contrary to public policies of a 
country is possible and clearer than compare against principles of the whole law 
system. This deviation to the Model Law and the NYC leaves a gap of 
confusion and sidestep in recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral 
awards in Vietnam as well as implementation international treaties regards the 
same issue. In this regard, Vietnam legal framework falls short of the EVFTA 
investment court.   
Another important issue is the current situation of reversed burden of 
proof happening in Vietnam which is inconsistent to the NYC provisions. 
Under the NYC, if the award debtor wants to object to the enforcement of a 
foreign arbitral award, the award debtor has to provide proof to base his 
objection. Nevertheless, as analysed in part II, in Vietnam the practice is quite 
different. It is the award creditor who is required by Vietnamese courts to 
provide proof to turn down the other party’s objection. This practice results in a 
situation in which the award debtors can raise as many objections as possible, 
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Article V.2 the New York Convention 1985  
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even frivolous, in order to stonewall legitimate rights of the award creditor. 
Most importantly, the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral award in 
Vietnam hardly takes progress unless this practice is improved.  
To comply with the EU-Vietnam FTA, the Government of Viet Nam 
needs to adjust its rules regarding the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards promptly. It is important to remind that the arbitral awards rendered by 
the ICS are binding upon Vietnam from day one since the EVFTA comes into 
force, and the recognition and enforcement shall be conducted pursuant to the 
NYC in the first five years. In other words, Vietnam has only five years to act 
and bring its legal framework closer to the international guidelines. After five 
years, the final arbitral award in respect of disputes where Viet Nam is the 
respondent shall be binding, not subject to appeal, review, set aside, annulment 
and enforced as if it were a final judgment of a court in Vietnam itself (Article 
31 para.1, para.2).  
Considering all divergences above, Vietnam’s government should 
instantly revise and adjust its legal framework to prepare before the treaty going 
into effect. Not only to prepare for the ICS of the EVFTA, Vietnam’s legal 
framework must also brace up for the future multilateral dispute settlement 
mechanism as it committed to establish via Article 15 of the EVFTA. Particular 
recommendations for preparation will be proposed below. 
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Part 5. Some recommendations for Vietnam’s legal preparation with the 
EVFTA ahead    
5.1 Legal review 
Modifying from and being based on the existing ISDS arbitration system, 
the ICS under the EVFTA will be applied in practice for the first time between 
Vietnam and the EU. As the establishment and operation of the investment 
court mechanisms with standing bodies Tribunal and Appeal Tribunal are 
completely outside the scope of application of Vietnamese law, there is no 
legislative modification or amendments required for these aspects of the ICS. 
However, there is surely a significant amount of work regarding legal review 
for Viet Nam to do so as to establish and achieve a smooth operation of this 
System. 
 
 Include a Suggested Law 
  From the analysis above, in our opinion Vietnam’s legislation is mostly 
not compatible with the ICS in the EVFTA, or more exactly Vietnam domestic 
law does not bear any resemblance or not cover the provisions of the ICS. 
Although this mechanism is not applied for Vietnamese investors against 
Vietnamese government and does not affect the domestic dispute settlement 
arbitration procedures, but it is applicable to European investors against 
Vietnamese government in disputes in accordance with the scope provided for 
under the EVFTA. Moreover, the commitments in respect to the recognition and 
enforcement of final awards are totally within the scope of Vietnam’s 
legislation. What Vietnam needs to do now to make the country’s legislation 
compatible with the EVFTA is shortly covering the implementation of 
commitments to the ICS under the domestic laws in a form of a Suggested Law.  
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This Suggested Law may be designed to be about implementation of the 
EVFTA on Investment as general or separately on the Investment Court 
System. If the former, the Suggested Law is better off including the 
interpretation again the coverage and specific terms for the EU partners since 
some terms are clear and detailed enough to be directly applied in practice but 
some terms are different. For example, according to the general provisions of 
EVFTA, a natural person who just “seeks to make an investment” is regarded as 
“an investor”, meanwhile Vietnamese legislation define investor differently. 
Under Vietnam law, investor means “an organization or individual that makes 
business investment; investors include Vietnamese investors, foreign investors 
and foreign invested business organization”112. In other words, a person that has 
made investments shall be called ‘investor’ in Vietnam while a person attempts 
to (not necessarily can make or has made) make investment shall be called 
‘investor’ under the EVFTA. These substantial terms should be internalized into 
domestic law, and a Suggested Law is a good way to do that. If the latter or in 
both cases, the Suggested Law must cover obligations of Vietnam government 
to the ICS, particularly the commitments to the legal validity of the ICS awards 
that hold in Vietnam. Once being ratified by Vietnam National Assembly, this 
Suggested Law will administer the investor-State dispute relations between EU 
investors and Vietnam government and replace all specialized legislations for 
EU's investors heretofore. The WTO’s Report Review113 proposed that the 
Suggested Law on implementing the EVFTA on Investment should be regarded 
as an Omnibus Bill and at a Law-level document due to its nature of covering of 
a number of diverse regulations simultaneously.114 
 
                                                
112	Article 3, Law on Investment (Law No.67/2014/QH13) 
113 VCCI (n 95) 
114 For the reasons, see VCCI report (n 95)	
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 Issues in respect to compliance with the NYC 
During the first five years after the entry into force of the Agreement, the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Vietnam shall be in 
accordance with the NYC but local courts are in charge of the application and 
authorized to review an award given by the ICS. They shall look at procedural 
issues and other grounds for rejection of application provided by domestic laws. 
Therefore, in this period, it is important to direct Vietnam’s implementation 
towards more compatible to the NYC. Currently, there are two fundamental 
issues that need to be addressed promptly to make Vietnam’s compliance more 
in line with the NYC as well as international principles, they are about the 
principles of law as ground of rejection an award; and the burden of proof.  
 At the moment, Vietnam is not specifying what their principles of law are 
and the interpretation they give in Resolution 01 is not clear enough. Vietnam 
should not continue to keep this provision for a ground of rejection without any 
adjustment in the future. It is advisable that Vietnam should introduce a by-law 
document that replaces the Resolution 01 providing that the fundamentals of 
law in the LCA are interpreted as fundamentals of public policy. Principles of 
public policy often underpin the operation of legal system in a country. It will 
administer the commitment of a nation to recognize and give effect to a foreign 
law (or in this case, a foreign arbitral award) in appropriate circumstances and 
govern the exceptions in which that foreign law is perceived to be injurious or 
harmful to public interest. In fact, these fundamentals are known under various 
names but with the same nature such as “public policy” or “policy of the law” in 
common law countries, or “ordre public”, “statutory prohibition” or “kojo 
ryozoku” in civil law countries,115 but all of which are basically the exclusions 
of prohibitions to law and social moral. Given that the NYC and the Model Law 
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both use the term “public policy”; Vietnam should consider adjusting to 
approach in the same way.  
The second issue is the Government need to assure that the Courts’ 
practice of burden of proof will be consistent with the EVFTA. In case of 
application for rejection from the award debtor, Vietnamese courts should only 
impose the obligation of providing evidence on the one who raises the 
objection; and it is not the responsibility of the debtor to explain why that 
objection is invalid. This correction could be included in the same by-law 
document on guiding the implementation the enforcement of arbitral awards. 
 
 
 Comprehensive legal review: 
Beyond fixing the two points above, Vietnamese government should 
continue conducting a comprehensive compatibility review of its legal 
framework as soon as possible far in advance the Agreement takes effect. Until 
now none of such wide-scope review is known of. This comprehensive legal 
review not only helps prepare for the EVFTA mechanism but also aims to 
calculate all advisability of a future single international mechanism, which 
Vietnam has committed in the EVFTA to establish together with the EU and 
other partners in the. 
Areas of law that need to be revised is those that are relevant to the 
recognition and enforcement of awards issued by the ICS, as followed. 
- the LCA 2010 and its implementing legal texts - in order to study the ICS 
mechanism compared to domestic arbitration activities in Vietnam. 
- Laws on civil procedures including the Civil Code 2015, the Civil 
Procedural Code 2004, the Law on Execution of civil judgment 2008 – in 
order to examine the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards practice. 
- Law on Investment and its implementing regulations – in order to revise 
the nature of dispute that has arbitrability. 
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This thorough revision will help Vietnam government grasp the nature of 
the ICS firmly, knowing what contents need to be modified and decide which 
form of such modification should take (i.e. whether it is an amendment law, a 
by-law document e.g. a Resolution, a Decree, a Circular guiding the 
implementation of the agreement).  
This process must be accelerated because even when Vietnam has determined 
the formality of revision, it still takes time for such legal document comes into 
effect. Meanwhile, Vietnam only has five years after the entry into force of the 
EVFTA, which is expected to be in 2018, to prepare for the complete 
application of the ICS. Whichever kind of amendment or Suggested Law is, 
there is definitely a need to appoint specifically which authority is responsible 
for implementing that amend rules. 
Finally, after revising legal framework to make it compatible to 
application for the EU investors, Vietnam should also consider some certain 
adjustment for its domestic investors but must be in accordance with the MFN 
and NT commitments under all circumstances. Critics show that ISDS in BITs 
is silent on human rights – an integrated factor in investment dispute 
resolution116. For now, ISDS just stopped at looking at human rights as due 
process rights or procedural fairness, rather than having a right-based approach 
– “the integration of human rights as an authoritative legal regime consisting of 
legally enforceable entitlements”117, while investors are actively and 
strategically engaging human rights argumentation into their claims directly or 
indirectly. For example, Biloune, a Syrian investor, based his claim for human 
rights violation, including arrest, detention and deportation, besides contractual 
                                                
116 Vivian Kube and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, European University Institute, Working Papers Law 
2016/02 Department of Law, Human rights law and international investment arbitration, ISSN 1725-
6739  
117 Ibid 
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breaches of an agreement between him and Ghana government118, or investor 
Rompetrol claimed for due process rights alleging that they had suffered 
arbitrary criminal investigations and been turned into “a target of state- 
orchestrated harassment”.119 These examples are to show the close linkage 
between human rights and investment dispute. However, it is very difficult to 
either assess the impact of human rights argumentation, and judicial system 
should have a balanced approach between investor rights and human rights. 
Otherwise, ISDS end up prioritizing foreign investors’ interests by allowing 
them to freely make claims against host States’ regulatory measures while this 
privilege is not available for domestic investors. 
After all, domestic investors should be taken care of as much as the EU 
ones, and it is completely possible that it would come to a point in the future 
when Vietnamese investors would demand the same privileged treatment as the 
EU ones. What Vietnam can do now is revising its legislation to prevent 
investment dispute arising from the EVFTA or arising domestically, and 
develop a national strategy on investment dispute prevention if necessary.  	
 
 
5.2 ICSID membership pursuit  
 
Vietnam has five-year period for the recognition and enforcement of 
awards to be subject to the NYC, after that the national courts will not be able to 
review the final arbitral awards but recognize and enforce it as if it is a final 
judgement comes from their own national court.  Therefore, in the near future, 
Vietnam can consider joining ICSID Convention Membership to facilitate its 
implementation of the commitments to the Investment dispute resolution under 
                                                
118 Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v. Ghana Investments Centre and the Government of 
Ghana, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability. 27 October 1989, Award on Damages and 
Costs. 30 June 1990, https://www.biicl.org/files/3935_1990_biloune_v_ghana.pdf  
119 The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/3, Award 6 May 2013 	
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw1408.pdf   
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the EVFTA as well as to enhance Vietnam’s legal practice with other partners 
in respect of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in 
investment dispute. Given the popularity of the ICSD fora and the fact that 
nearly all member states of the EU have signed and ratified the ICSID 
Convention (except Poland), if Vietnam becomes a member of the ICSID, the 
Convention can also become a solid source of binding two Parties’ governments 
and be applicable to final awards by the ICS of EVFTA as well. Vietnam should 
consider taking this step within the time scheduled of five-year period since 
entry into force of the Agreement, or within the time schedule for adopting any 
Suggested Law or amendment law.  
 
 
5.3 Responsible ministries and the need of coordination  
 
According to the Section 4 Resolution of Investment Disputes, there are 
two groups of Vietnamese agencies involved in the operation of the ICS 
mechanism: (i) the agencies who will directly participate in the process of the 
investor-State dispute resolution, which includes participation in mediation, 
amicable settlement, mandatory consultation, and resolution proceedings of the 
Tribunal system. This group mainly includes members of Investment Tribunal 
System, Vietnam’s government and especially the Ministry of Justice (MOJ); 
(ii) the agencies who keep working on the negotiation of the commitments 
under the EVFTA to establish and maintain a smooth operation of the 
investment court system. This second group of agencies must carry out a 
number of tasks to prepare for the Decisions of the Trade Committee shortly 
after the entry into force of the Agreement. For better compliance and 
implementation of the EVFTA’s commitments in respect of the Investment 
Dispute Resolution, the recommendations are mainly discussed about this 
group. The tasks that the second group needs to prepare pursuant to Sub-Section 
3 are listed as follows: 
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o appoint the Members of the Tribunal and the Members of the Appeal 
Tribunal (Article 12 para.2, Article 13 para.3) 
o determine the amount of the retainer fee and other expenses for Members of 
Tribunal and Appeal Tribunal and of the Presidents of the Tribunal and 
Appeal Tribunal (Article 12 para.14,16,17; Article 13 para.14,16,17) 
o adopt the draft working procedures of the Tribunal or Appeal Tribunal 
(Article 12 para.10, Article 13 para. 10) 
o adopt interpretations of the agreement which shall be binding on the 
Tribunal and Appeal Tribunal, if any (Article 16 para. 4) 
o adopt a decision stipulating that Article 3(3) of the UNCITRAL 
Transparency Rules applies instead of paragraph 3 of Article 20 
(Transparency of Proceedings) if upon request of either Party (Article 20 
para.6) 
o start to plan for negotiations for a Multilateral Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism (Article 15) 
 
According to the above list, the most relevant and responsible agencies of 
Vietnam involved in the whole operation of the ICS are: The Ministry of 
Justice, The Ministry of Planning and Investment, and the Department of 
Planning and investment under the People’s Committee.  
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) belongs to the executive branch of 
Vietnam’s government, which direct, instruct, inspect and organize the 
implementation of laws and regulations. The MOJ performs the state 
management on execution of civil judgements, judicial-administrative activities 
and other justice works nationwide.120  
                                                
120 For functions, tasks, powers and organizational structure of the Ministry of Justice of Vietnam, see 
Decree No. 22/2013/ND-CP dated 13 March 2013; the Ministry’s official website: 
 http://www.moj.gov.vn/en/Pages/Introduction.aspx   
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The Ministry of Planning and Investment is a government agency which 
perform the functions of state management in planning, development 
investment and statistics.121 The agency also has responsibility to consult the 
government of national socio-economic development strategies and policies, 
domestic and foreign investment, etc. The MPI plays a key role in the 
negotiation and implementation of the EVFTA investment chapter. 
Another relevant agency is the Department of Planning and Investment 
(DPI). The DPI does not belong to the MPI but it is a specialized agency under 
the management of the provincial-level People’s Committee which is equivalent 
to a ministry-level agency. In other words, each province (or centrally-run cities 
i.e. Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, Da Nang, etc.) has its own People’s Committee and a 
Department of Planning and Investment underneath. The DPI has the role to 
assist the People's Committees in the province to perform the functions of state 
management in planning and investment at local level. The People’s 
Committees manages the organization, staffing and operation of the DPI, 
meanwhile the DPI is put under the guidance, inspection and testing expertise 
and profession of the MPI.122 
Given the functions and responsibilities of these agencies and given the 
amount of work listed above to prepare for the Decision of the Trade 
Committee in the Tribunal System, coordination among these governmental 
agencies is highly recommended and could be indicated as below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
121 For functions, tasks, powers and organizational structure of the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, see Decree No. 116/2008/ND-CP dated 14th November 2008; and the Ministry’s official 
website: 
http://www.mpi.gov.vn/en/Pages/cnnv.aspx  
122 For functions, tasks, powers and organizational structure of the Department of Planning and 
Investment, see Joint Circular No.05/2009/TTLT-BKHĐT-BNV   
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Figure 5.1 Relevant Ministries and agency responsible and involved in the 
process of ICS mechanism under the EVFTA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The MOJ, in cooperation with the MPI may:  
ü Establish new or appoint a specific office within the MOJ who would 
play a supervisory role and responsible for keeping track on all 
investment disputes settled by the ICS under the EVFTA. This office 
would have the role to superintend the compliance of claims brought 
against Vietnam, in order to identify if they are in accordance with 
Article 7, Sub-Section 3. Moreover, the MOJ shall lead the dispute 
settlement process under the direction of the Government but this 
established office has responsibility to assist the MOJ regards 
administration work such as collecting and providing necessary evidence 
and arguments if required. Updated information and timing are very 
crucial in order to seek early decisions from the Tribunal to void 
unfounded or invalid claims.  
 
Department of Planning 
and Investment 
Ministry of Justice Ministry of Planning and Investment People’s Committee 
Government 
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ü Secure its infrastructure and organizational structure so that the 
information is transferred and provided from the MOJ to the Tribunal, 
and between the MOJ with other relevant bodies smoothly and in a timely 
manner. The MOJ definitely will lead the dispute settlement process and 
take charge at the provision of necessary evidence or arguments, such as 
in case of an objection to the transparency or a need for redaction of 
confidential information for instance (Article 20). 
 
ü Immediately start to carry out a thorough search for preeminent nominees 
for the Investment Tribunal System, both domestic and foreign ones. 
Article 12 and Article 13 of the EVFTA stipulated that these two panels 
are standing bodies of the investment court system whose all members 
are to be selected for a fixed long term (four-year period with possible 
once renewal), and thus the choice must be made very carefully. This 
process should start as soon as possible since both Parties are preparing 
final steps for the Agreement coming into effect. Understanding clearly 
about the national legal system and judicial office structure of Vietnam, 
the MOJ should set up further detailed requirements than those provided 
for in the Agreement in order to select the most suitable nominees for the 
Tribunal and Appeal Tribunal. Not only the criteria to nominate, Vietnam 
government should consider the procedure of selection (i.e. how they 
come to such a decision, priority ranking of criteria, whether there is any 
application round for candidates to apply themselves to be selected, or 
would it be an appointment from Government to carry out task for the 
state, etc.). A clear, transparent process is essential and helps boost 
efficiency, and it is important to bear in mind that the members of the 
Investment Tribunal System must be completely independent from the 
Government’s influence both directly and indirectly.  
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The MPI is an indispensable agency in this process: 
ü The MPI should coordinate the MOJ in the process of selecting 
distinguished members for the ICS. MPI will assist the MOJ in respect of 
consultation on expertise of investment field. The MPI has in hand a 
network of relevant stakeholders, including governmental agencies, 
domestic and foreign investors in Vietnam, etc. The MPI should consult 
with them to understand their perspectives, know what they expect in a 
dispute resolution process and how their rights and benefits can be 
represented. From which the MPI will give consultation to the MOJ in 
return about what specific qualities is valued in the issue of investment 
disputes. 
 
ü The MPI should direct the Department of Planning and Investment to 
supervise the investment practice at local level, so as to prevent dispute 
arising from investment relation. The Department of Planning and 
Investment is under the administration of People’s Committee but still 
subject on the direction, inspection in respect of investment field from the 
MPI. It’s time to establish a channel of report and review vertically 
between local authority and national authority. The Department along 
with the People’s Committee should provide periodic report updating 
investment practice of foreign investor in the local, especially EU’s 
investor, identifying obstacles if any. This helps supervise the investment 
and also the implementation of the Agreement commitments related to 
investment.  
 
 Furthermore, the MPI and MOJ can coordinate together in many aspects. 
Together the MPI and the MOJ can establish a specialized arbitration or 
mediation centre that solely settles investment dispute between EU investors 
and Vietnam government. This centre shall make efforts to resolve the disputes 
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by amicable method or mediation first, before letting the claims to be brought to 
the ICS. Although this establishment is not mandatory under the agreement, but 
it is very important to maintain a productive relationship between investors and 
a host State. Investors and government should address their grievances at a very 
early stage by various ADR such as mediation, conciliation, etc. or any other 
problem-solving techniques to prevent their conflicts escalated into full-blown 
legal disputes123. The Investment Climate Unit, World Bank Group addressed 
the same issue, promoting the concept of “investor-State conflict management 
mechanisms” (CMMs) that are institutional or contractual mechanisms whose 
function is helping disputing parties to assess conflicts and find course of 
action. In an investment dispute, an unpleased investor will certainly seek 
consultancy from various experts about issues related to his investment (e.g. 
taxation, landing, contracts, investment registration, capital, banking, funding, 
environment, etc.). This suggested centre in Vietnam would play an important 
role in preventing claims and investment dispute in advance, advise EU 
investors so as to help resolve their grievance, encouraging them to settle 
disputes in amicable manner and advise them of jurisdiction, possibility of 
dispute, whether if EU investors should make claims at the ICS. Therefore, the 
officials of this centre must be the ones coming from MPI and MOJ, having 
expertise and understanding Vietnam’s investment protection obligations and 
commitments under the ICS.  
 Finally, on the journey of the next 5 years following the entry into effect 
of the EVFTA, a lot of work can be improved and a lot of agencies can be 
involved to equip Vietnam for the implementation of the commitments to the 
ICS mechanism. Not only the MPI, the MOJ but also judicial system including 
the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuracies, various bodies 
                                                
123 Global Practice on Trade and Competitiveness – Investment Climate Unit, World Bank Group. 
Investor-State Conflict Management: A Preliminary Sketch, E15Initiative. 
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of the Government, the National Assembly, should join hands in the 
preparation. It’s about time for Vietnam to have a specific national strategy 
about investment dispute prevention in the future and particularly focus on 
investment dispute arising from EVFTA.  
 
5.5 Database system development 
Once Vietnam has entered the FTA with the EU, it is ideal to develop a 
web-based system that specialized designed to serve the compliance of Parties 
to the investment dispute resolution of the EVFTA. This website will provide 
information, instruct investors the necessary steps and procedures to make a 
claim under the system, as well as make necessary documents available to 
public pursuant to the Agreement’s regulation of Transparency. Such website 
would benefit both Vietnamese and EU investors in Vietnam, and Vietnam 
government. Financial resources should be exploited to make use of online 
infrastructure, helping reduce and simplify burden of manual management, and 
raise public awareness at the same time.   
Vietnam can consider joining the United Nations Convention on 
Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State arbitration 2014 (or so-called the 
Mauritius Convention on Transparency) with its Transparency Registry. By 
giving signature to the Mauritius Convention, Parties give their consent to apply 
the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency 2014. Along with procedural rules for 
greater transparency, the Convention provides for a Transparency Registry124 
which is a repository website for the publication of information and documents 
in treaty-based ISDS. Looking at the Transparency Registry, we see that Canada 
is the most active member. Canada uploads quite frequently and sufficiently 
detailed documents related to their ISDS cases, from notice of intent, post-
hearing brief, submission on costs, etc., to Award of the Tribunal. We can see 
that Canada’s serious implementation of making information transparent and 
                                                
124	See Transparency Registry site http://www.uncitral.org/transparency-registry/registry/index.jspx 
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available to public could explain their efficiency of governance regime, and 
Vietnam can follow Canada’s experience by using this gate. Vietnam can 
collect useful information from other countries’ ISDS cases accumulated in this 
wide platform as well. 
Besides, in Vietnam the website of WTO Center and Integration by the 
VCCI is well content-developed, frequently updating a large number of reports 
in various fields of FTAs that Vietnam either already entered or in the process 
of negotiations. Vietnam government can consider develop further content of 
ICS on this platform because Vietnamese language is friendlier to Vietnamese 
investors, or establish their information repository on UNCTAD’s Transparency 
Registry tool. 
 
5.6 Increased awareness  
 
Before EVFTA takes into effect, or any other new generation FTA with 
high commitments, or even whenever a nation has a new strategy and policy, it 
is important to raise awareness among public and investors to facilitate its path 
of progress for compliance to such commitments. In this case, Vietnam 
government can focus on raising public awareness to express their will to 
endorse the Tribunal’s final awards. This could be performed by some 
awareness-raising activities such as broadcasting information to public, legal 
communities and enterprises communities about the new arbitration system. We 
can see that overseas there are countless articles, news over media and also 
research papers in the EU, the U.S and the Canada in which the public show a 
lot of controversial opinions and arguments about the investment tribunal 
system in EU’s proposals, not to mention the amount of research journals 
conducted on the issue. This to say that the interest and concern of public about 
the topic is very strong, diversified and widely discussed. However, in Vietnam 
we do not see any news or articles that deliver the topic of the ICS in EVFTA. 
This odd quietness might have something to do with the Government’s 
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influence on limiting the negative effect of the mechanism. Specifically, it is a 
common fear that the ICS enable a Government to be exposed to being sue by a 
foreign investor, as discussed in part 2 of this paper. However, efforts in raising 
public awareness and making things more opened shall definitely help affirm 
the Vietnamese and EU investors’ confidence in the fairness and effectiveness 
of the ICS mechanism. 
For public awareness, the Government can take advantages of the website 
system discussed above, to introduce general contents of the ICS (what is it for, 
who can claimants, who can be defendants, what are valid alleged claims and 
procedure, etc.). The contents for this purpose should be in plain language to 
inform general interested public and investors. 
 
5.7 	Capacity training and technical assistance 
 
The investment court put in use definitely requires further technical 
assistance from both parties in form of training to develop human resources’ 
capacity in the issue. Not only staffs, officials but academics training should be 
encouraged. At the moment, the European Trade Policy and Investment Support 
Project125 (EU-MUTRAP) in Vietnam has proved its efficiency in facilitating 
Vietnam’s integration into the regional trading system and support EU-Vietnam 
trade and investment relations. Through various activities, such as workshops, 
conferences, training programs, etc., the support of MUTRAP does help 
Vietnam to meet certain standards to international. Given the complex nature of 
the ICS, Vietnam is absolutely in need of further technical assistance, for 
instance in research capacity and personnel.  
                                                
125 MUTRAP is the Multilateral Trade Assistance Project whose main sponsor is European Union and 
the executing authority and implementing agency is Ministry of Industry and Trade of Vietnam 
(MOIT). The purpose of the project is “to support the MOIT in facilitating sustainable international 
trade and investment through improved capacity for policy making, policy consultation, and the 
negotiation and implementation of related commitments, particularly vis-à-vis the EU” 
(http://mutrap.org.vn/index.php/en/home ) 
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Technical assistance can take place in many forms. It is ideal to have 
technical assistance from investment law expertise from international combined 
with Vietnamese training program. Perhaps Vietnam should seek advice from 
Argentina – the most frequent respondent States or from the U.S, Netherlands – 
the most frequent home States of claimants126, given their experienced 
involvement in ISDS. Moreover, external support is not enough. Sometimes 
international experience is not tailored to domestic needs and not suited to apply 
directly into domestic current practice. A combination of both foreign and 
domestic approach is very useful. They would play an important role in helping 
Vietnam’s government and relevant Ministries to: 
-  conduct legal review; 
- share lesson experiences in investment disputes resolution; 
- draft our strategic plan or roadmap for investment disputes prevention; 
- or implement training programs for Vietnamese officials in responsible 
ministries. The Government of Vietnam should encourage education and 
training of international law at university level or promote professional 
training programs for investment lawyers, judicial officials, in order to 
prepare for the operation of the ICS in the long run. 
 
 
 
   *********************************** 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
126	UNCTAD, IIA Issues Note International Investment Agreements, Issue 3, November 2017, 
Special Update on Investor-State dispute settlement: Facts and figures 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/diaepcb2017d7_en.pdf		
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